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The Three Laws: The Chinese
Communist Party Throws Down the
Data Regulation Gauntlet
William Chaskes*
Abstract
Criticism of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) runs a
wide gamut. Accusations of human rights abuses, intellectual
property theft, authoritarian domestic policies, disrespecting
sovereign borders, and propaganda campaigns all have one
common factor: the CCP’s desire to control information.
Controlling information means controlling data. Lurking
beneath the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) tumultuous
relationship with the rest of the world is the fight between nations
to control their citizens’ data while also keeping it out of the
hands of adversaries. The CCP’s Three Laws are its newest
weapon in this data war.
One byproduct of the CCP’s emphasis on controlling the
narrative is that analyzing the PRC’s laws and policies requires
reading between the lines—in the dark, by candlelight. Even the
most informed analysis requires assumptions. The Three Laws
are no different. Their broad language, drastic penalties, and
sweeping scope rule out the traditional tools of statutory
interpretation. Ordinary meaning, canons of construction, and
legislative history are useless. In the PRC, the law means what
the CCP says it means. To understand the Three Laws and
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B.A., Florida State University. Thank you, Professor Joshua A.T. Fairfield, for
serving as my Note Advisor and to the members of the W&L Law Review. I am
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Special thanks to Jerry Sussman, a great business partner and mentor, who
taught me about the power of data and how to break things.

1169

1170

79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1169 (2022)

predict the associated regulatory risks, lawyers, economists, and
politicians alike must think and reason by analogy.
This
Note
offers
analyses,
case
studies,
and
recommendations that provide practitioners a solid framework
to assess a company’s regulatory risk under the Three Laws.
First, this Note outlines the guiding tenets of the CCP to
understand the motivations behind the Three Laws. Next, it
provides case studies of different companies’ relationships with
the CCP. Realizing how the CCP has dealt with some of the
largest companies in the world—Ant Group, Didi Chuxing,
Apple, Tesla—is crucial to understanding the threat of future
capricious CCP action.
This Note then analyzes alleged CCP hacking campaigns
and global influence building so the reader may better
understand the types of actions that the CCP undertakes—and
fears being done to it by others. Finally, this Note provides
recommendations for companies with different levels of exposure
to the CCP and its ability to enforce its laws. Ultimately, this
Note provides the reader with a primer on an important
geopolitical issue: the shadowy battle between the world’s great
powers to control their citizens’ information, procure their
adversaries’ data, and the ways that the law is being used to
further these goals.
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INTRODUCTION

The rise of Xi Jinping, the paramount leader for life of the
People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP),1 has been accompanied by the rise of “wolf warrior
diplomacy.”2 This assertive attitude is named after a 2015
patriotic film and has steadily become a nigh-default tactic for
PRC officials seeking to “defend China’s national interests, often
in confrontational ways.”3 This emboldened approach to
international relations has crept into PRC domestic regulations
with extraterritorial effect. The wolf warrior philosophy is
central to the PRC’s new privacy and cybersecurity laws.
The CCP views controlling cyberspace as a national
priority.4 In furtherance of this prerogative, the PRC has passed
three laws that together comprise a framework for PRC

1. See Eleanor Albert et al., The Chinese Communist Party, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELS., https://perma.cc/5LV9-2EKH (last updated June 23, 2021, 3:00
PM) (“The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is the founding and ruling
political party of modern China, officially known as the People’s Republic of
China. The CCP has maintained a political monopoly since its founding a
century ago . . . .”).
2. See Joanna Nawrotkiewicz & Peter Martin, Understanding Chinese
“Wolf Warrior Diplomacy”, NAT’L BUREAU ASIAN RSCH. (Oct. 22, 2021),
https://perma.cc/3X7L-QK88
Wolf Warrior diplomacy has become the shorthand expression for a new,
assertive brand of Chinese diplomacy. In the past, Chinese diplomats
tended to keep a lower profile and to be quite cautious and moderate in the
way that they interacted with the outside world. Recently, however, they
have become far more strident and assertive—exhibiting behavior that
ranges from storming out of an international meeting to shouting at foreign
counterparts and even insulting foreign leaders.

3. Zhiqun Zhu, Interpreting China’s ‘Wolf-Warrior Diplomacy’, THE
DIPLOMAT (May 15, 2020), https://perma.cc/YEZ4-ABQH. But see Zhanna
Malekos Smith, New Tail for China’s ‘Wolf Warrior’ Diplomats, CTR. FOR
STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. (Oct. 13, 2021), https://perma.cc/S3VQ-GSLM
(analyzing recent speeches by Xi Jinping that may signal a lessening of the
“wolf warrior” phenomenon).
4. See A Rising “Cyber China”, TURKISH POL’Y Q. (Dec. 7, 2021),
https://perma.cc/J76A-M8TN (“When Bill Clinton famously compared China’s
efforts to suppress free online discussion as ‘trying to nail Jell-O to the wall,’
he underestimated the [CCP]’s determination to adopt an internet that both
facilitates China’s development and preserves the Party’s governing power.”).
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cybersecurity and privacy issues.5 These three laws (the “Three
Laws”) are: (i) the Cyber Security Law (CSL);6 (ii) the Personal
Information Protection Law (PIPL);7 and (iii) the Data Security
Law (DSL).8 The Three Laws create the bedrock legal
infrastructure for achieving the PRC’s cyberspace and
geopolitical ambitions.9 This legal foundation relies on
categorizing data that the CCP values and, conversely, views as
a threat if such data were accessible by PRC adversaries.
This Note will attempt to answer the question “what kind
of data types and activities would draw the ire of PRC
regulators?” Given the broad, vague language of the Three
Laws, PRC authorities clearly have ample flexibility to apply
any of the Three Laws to further national strategic objectives.10
These laws are interrelated and must be read together—but
even that does not provide enough clarity to assess regulatory
risk. The ambiguity of how the PRC makes and enforces laws
5. See Clarice Yu et al., Are You Ready? PRC Data Security Law Was
Passed and Will Come into Effect on 1 September 2021!, BIRD & BIRD (June 17,
2021), https://perma.cc/7NJM-VLV9 (“The CSL, the DSL and the PIPL will
represent three pillars of the Chinese data legislation system and together
form an overarching framework governing the data processing and
cybersecurity issues.”).
6. See Rogier Creemers et al., Translation: Cybersecurity Law of the
People’s Republic of China (Effective June 1, 2017), STAN. UNIV. DIGICHINA
CYBER POL’Y CTR. (June 29, 2018), https://perma.cc/CMB8-ZAQ2.
7. See Rogier Creemers & Graham Webster, Translation: Personal
Information Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China—Effective Nov.
1, 2021, STAN. UNIV. DIGICHINA CYBER POL’Y CTR. (Aug. 20, 2021) [hereinafter
PIPL], https://perma.cc/2NRV-7CDN (last updated Sept. 7, 2021).
8. See Translation: Data Security Law of the People’s Republic of China
(Effective Sept. 1, 2021), STAN. UNIV. DIGICHINA CYBER POL’Y CTR. (June 29,
2021) [hereinafter DSL], https://perma.cc/RAB4-SMC2.
9. See Xiang Wang et al., China’s New Data Security Law: What
International Companies Need to Know, ORRICK (Sept. 23, 2021),
https://perma.cc/EQ6U-LS8G (“This triad of new data laws represents an
increasingly comprehensive legal framework for privacy and data security in
the [world’s] second largest economy.”).
10. See Karry Lai, PRIMER: China’s Data Security Law, INT’L FIN. L.
REV. (Nov. 11, 2021), https://perma.cc/5RZR-3KJM (“Data protection experts
said that there are a number of areas that remain murky in the new
[DSL] . . . .”).
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and regulations creates difficulties for companies trying to
predict government action.11 To prepare for the future
ramifications of the Three Laws, companies and governments
must understand the CCP’s guiding philosophies, how the PRC
has dealt with data collection and use up to this point, and how
the Three Laws thrust data regulation headlong into the realms
of politics, diplomacy, and power.
This Note will first discuss and analyze the pertinent
language of the Three Laws.12 Next, it will orient the reader to
the guiding principles and philosophies that motivate the CCP
to impose such wide-reaching legislation.13 This Note then
provides case studies of CCP actions through a data-focused
lens.14 Finally, this Note analyzes the potential enforceability
and therefore overall regulatory risk of the Three Laws to
companies across the globe.15
I.

THE THREE LAWS

A. The Cyber Security Law
The CSL came into force on June 1, 2017.16 This expansive
law prescribes a sweeping list of requirements with particular
focus on controlling whether data is stored in the PRC (data
localization) and what data is allowed to leave the PRC’s borders
(cross-border transactions).17 As the first of the Three Laws to

11. See REEDSMITH LLP, CHINA’S CYBERSECURITY LAW 1 [hereinafter
CHINA’S CYBERSECURITY LAW], https://perma.cc/4RVN-6HXS (PDF) (“The
Chinese legislative and enforcement style creates confusion and
misunderstandings, and sometimes false hopes, for Western companies.”).
12. See infra Part I.
13. See infra Part II.
14. See infra Part III–VI.
15. See infra Parts VII–VIII.
16. CHINA’S CYBERSECURITY LAW, supra note 11, at 1.
17. See Samuel Yang, The Privacy, Data Protection and Cybersecurity
Law Review: China, THE L. REVS. (Nov. 5, 2021), https://perma.cc/84DG-27VW
(PDF)
Among other things, the CSL covers the following aspects: personal
information protection; general network protection obligations of the
network operators and the multi-level protection scheme (MLPS); enhanced
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be enacted, the CSL’s language is vague and broad, giving the
CSL an “over-reaching scope.”18 As a result, the CSL cannot be
understood in a vacuum. Achieving any clarity as to how
companies might rankle the CCP requires an examination of the
rest of the Three Laws as well as how the CSL is enforced.
B. The Personal Information Protection Law
The PIPL came into force on November 1, 2021.19 The law
states its rationale as “protect[ing] personal information rights
and interests, standardiz[ing] personal information handling
activities, and promot[ing] the rational use of personal
information.”20 Analogous to the European Union’s (EU) Global
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR),21 the PIPL increases
compliance costs, restricts what data can be stored, where data
can be stored, and how data is authorized to leave the PRC’s
borders.22 Enforced by the newly-created Cyberspace
Administration of China (CAC), the PIPL imposes harsh
financial penalties of up to fifty million CNY (approximately
$7.8 million USD) or five percent of the offending company’s
revenue from the previous year.23 The PIPL’s extraterritorial
reach is triggered “(1) [w]here the purpose is to provide products
protection for the critical information infrastructure (CII); data localization
and security assessment for the cross-border transfer of personal
information and important data; and security review of the network
products and services.

18. See CHINA’S CYBERSECURITY LAW, supra note 11, at 1 (“The path to
CSL compliance is not straightforward . . . . Despite this environment of
uncertainty and change, the Chinese authority has already begun initiating
enforcement actions for CSL violations.”).
19. See PIPL, supra note 7.
20. Id. art. 1.
21. Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and
Repealing Directive 95/46/EC, art. 9, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 (EU).
22. See Paul McKenzie, Top-5 Operational Impacts of China’s PIPL: Part
1—Scope, Key Definitions and Lawful Handling of Personal Information,
INT’L. ASS’N PRIV. PROS. (Feb. 10, 2022), https://perma.cc/7UBS-NM7B.
23. See PIPL, supra note 7, art. 66.
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or services to natural persons inside the [PRC]; (2) [w]here
analyzing or assessing activities of natural persons inside the
borders; [or] (3) [o]ther circumstances provided in laws or
administrative regulations.”24 This extraterritoriality provision
is broadly worded but centers around the concept of “sensitive
personal information”25 and, therefore, understanding what the
PRC considers “sensitive personal information” is key to
assessing a company’s regulatory risk under the PIPL.
Article 28 of the PIPL explicitly defines “sensitive personal
information” as “personal information that, once leaked or
illegally used, may easily cause harm to the dignity of natural
persons grave harm to personal or property security [sic].”26 The
PIPL provides a non-exclusive list of “sensitive personal
information,”
including
“information
on
biometric
characteristics, religious beliefs, specially-designated status,
medical health, financial accounts, individual location tracking,
etc., as well as the personal information of minors under the age
of 14.”27 While the PIPL adds additional clarity, the language is
still so broad that the law could be selectively enforced.28 Like
the rest of the Three Laws, the PIPL provides the CCP wide
latitude to enforce the Three Laws arbitrarily to further CCP
objectives.
C. The Data Security Law
On September 1, 2021, the PRC enacted the DSL.29 In
pertinent part, the DSL prescribes monetary sanctions for
expansive situations including “[w]hen data handling activities
outside the mainland territory of the PRC harm the national

24. See id. art. 3.
25. See id. art. 28 (explaining the PIPL’s focus on sensitive personal
information and providing a non-exhaustive list of examples).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See id. (prescribing that “only where there is a specific purpose and a
need to fulfill, and under circumstances of strict protection measures, may
personal information handlers handle sensitive personal information,”
without defining any of the key terms further).
29. DSL, supra note 8.
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security, the public interest, or the lawful rights and interests of
citizens or organizations of the PRC.”30 Keeping to the general
tenor of broad and expansive regulations, none of these three
categories are defined further in the text of the law.31 Absent
statutory definitions, CCP philosophies and past regulatory
actions provide the only indication as to what data the PRC
views as potentially harming these nebulous categories of “the
national security, the public interest, or the lawful rights and
interests of citizens or organizations of the PRC.”32 Optimism
that future regulations would provide definitive guidance was
misplaced, as subsequent regulations later expanded the scope
of the Three Laws.
D. Draft Regulations
On November 14, 2021, the CAC published draft
regulations for public comment designed to implement portions
of the Three Laws.33 These draft regulations drastically expand
the scope of the Three Laws.34 It was expected that the Three
Laws would apply to data activities within the PRC, but these
regulations would alarmingly apply to any data processing
whose purpose is to “monitor and evaluate the activities of
individuals and organizations in China; process ‘important data’
located in China; or comply with any conditions under other
Chinese law and regulation.”35 The Three Laws have already
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See Regulations on the Management of Online Data Security (Draft
for Solicitation of Comments), CHINA L. TRANSLATE (Nov. 14, 2021),
https://perma.cc/WD9J-XC7U (providing a crowdsourced translation of the
draft regulations); see also China Releases Draft Regulations on Network Data
Security Management, HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH LLP (Jan. 26, 2022)
[hereinafter China Releases Draft Regulations], https://perma.cc/MU5K-E8GA
(analyzing the draft regulations).
34. See China Releases Draft Regulations, supra note 33 (“The
exterritorial scope under the Draft Regulations is much broader than that
under the Three Laws.”).
35. Id.
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been used to order the removal of hundreds of Chinese apps from
PRC app stores for violations of any or all of the laws.36 The
broad language of the Three Laws and their attendant
regulations requires practitioners to holistically consider the
PRC’s cyberspace and geopolitical ambitions when interpreting
these statutes and regulations.37
II.

BACKGROUND

Analyzing anything CCP-related involves dealing with
ambiguity and unfamiliarity—even for those well-versed on the
PRC and its affairs. To best comprehend the motivations behind
the Three Laws, it is necessary to understand how the CCP
regulates, what its motivations and guiding principles are, and
how the value of data affects governmental and business
objectives.
A. Arbitrary CCP Action at Home and Abroad
CCP action can impact foreign companies either through
outright regulation or less obvious gamesmanship favoring PRC
actors. Foreign companies have long been concerned about
arbitrary CCP action that would entrench or bolster PRC
economic competitors.38 YUM! Brands and Uber divested
themselves of their PRC operations in the face of greater market
competition, management difficulties, and increased CCP
36. See Josh Ye & Coco Feng, China Internet Crackdown: Beijing Orders
App Stores to Remove Douban and 105 Other Apps, S. CHINA MORNING POST
(Dec. 9, 2021, 7:59 PM), https://perma.cc/6HCJ-GB29.
37. See Lai, supra note 10 (“[D]ata classification is a key challenge. For
instance, Article 21 of the [DSL] stipulates that important data and national
core data require significantly higher protection; however, as of now, the
authorities have not provided guidelines on how to define and identify
important data and national core data.” (internal quotation omitted)).
38. See China Travel Advisory, U.S. DEP’T STATE, (July 5, 2022),
https://perma.cc/Q6M7-PPLK (warning of the arbitrary experiences of
businesspersons, journalists, and others “subjected to prolonged
interrogations and extended detention without due process of law” in the
PRC); see also Eric Li, China and the Rule of Law, J. AM. AFFS. (2019),
https://perma.cc/HP2K-CHLB (“Businesses and individuals cannot operate
with predictability, nor even basic security of property and liberty.”).

THE THREE LAWS: THE CCP THROWS DOWN THE DATA
REGULATION GAUNTLET
1179
regulatory oversight.39 These divestitures by American
companies are a purposeful absence in one of the world’s largest
markets.40 Whether these companies were concerned about
competing with PRC companies in the face of potential PRC
regulation, supply problems, or difficulties managing PRC
operations from afar, they reached the decision that divesting
their PRC operations made better business sense than
remaining exposed to the whims of the CCP and other threats
endemic to doing business in the PRC.41 At a certain point the
risks of operating in the PRC were not worth the reward.
In evaluating such risks, companies must understand the
doctrines that undergird CCP actions. Most importantly, the
CCP’s cyber sovereignty and information domination
philosophies mandate a new datafocused analytical framework
for evaluating the risks of doing business with the
PRC—especially for companies that heavily rely on data. If data
control is the PRC’s goal, then foreign firms and governments
risk being caught flatfooted if they do not meticulously analyze
the informational advantage that private sector data control
provides governments—particularly the PRC.

39. See Stephanie Strom et al., Yum Brands to Split China Business into
Separate Company, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2015), https://perma.cc/KD2L-HXR4
(reporting on the YUM! divestiture and its potential motivations being food
safety issues, changing customer tastes, and local and international
competition); Alyssa Abkowitz & Rick Carew, Uber Sells China Operations to
Didi Chuxing, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 1, 2016, 1:06 PM), https://perma.cc/N2ZGJQQ9 (reporting on the Uber divestiture and remarking on the long history of
competition between Uber and the PRC company, Didi Chuxing).
40. See One Year Later, Yum China Thrives After Its Spin-off, THE
MOTLEY FOOL (Oct. 18, 2017, 4:42 PM), https://perma.cc/4H7S-3SBC
(analyzing the YUM! divestiture a year later and evaluating the supply chain,
competition, and regulatory motivations for the deal).
41. See William C. Kirby, The Real Reason Uber is Giving Up in China,
HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug. 2, 2016), https://perma.cc/PS57-AE2L (“Uber is leaving
China not because of interference from its rivals but because of interference
from the state.”).
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B. Cyber Sovereignty and Information Domination

Internet security and control is a PRC national priority
cloaked under the mantra of cyber sovereignty.42 This concept of
“cyber sovereignty” is nebulously defined but presents itself
most acutely in censorship and strict controls on not allowing
access to PRC data to any but the CCP.43 To fully grasp this
concept and its ramifications, a key consideration is the PRC
model of central control and the lack of any theoretical barriers
between the public and private sectors.44 As the head of the
United Kingdom’s MI5 remarked in a joint press conference
with the head of the FBI, “The CCP adopts a whole-of-state
approach in which businesses and individuals are forced by law
to co-operate with the Party.”45 With no lines between the public
and private sectors, this cyber sovereignty approach has
ramifications on censorship and regulation of PRC and foreign
citizens and companies behind the Golden Shield Project,
colloquially known as the Great Firewall, which isolates the
PRC from the rest of the global internet.46 Additionally, the
42. See China Internet: Xi Jinping Calls for ‘Cyber Sovereignty’, BBC
(Dec. 16, 2015), https://perma.cc/CKC8-JPLY (reporting Xi’s comments
emphasizing “cyber sovereignty” as a “clear sign” of PRC national priorities).
43. See Elliot Zaagman, Cyber Sovereignty and the PRC’s Vision for
Global Internet Governance, THE JAMESTOWN FOUND. (June 5, 2018, 7:00 PM),
https://perma.cc/2YFL-BAME (remarking that PRC cyber sovereignty, at its
core, concerns “sophisticated, systematic censorship through a well-developed
‘Great Firewall,’ and strict requirements for local data storage imposed upon
all firms operating within its borders”).
44. See Stephen Olson, Are Private Chinese Companies Really Private?,
THE DIPLOMAT (Sept. 30, 2020), https://perma.cc/8KNZ-UPFC (analyzing the
PRC Central Committee “Opinion on Strengthening the United Front Work of
the Private Economy in the New Era,” which “tells us in no uncertain terms
that Chinese private companies will be increasingly called upon to conduct
their operations in tight coordination with governmental policy objectives and
ideologies”); SCOTT LIVINGSTON, THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY TARGETS THE
PRIVATE SECTOR (Oct. 2020), https://perma.cc/Q36Z-MWQH (PDF).
45. Ken McCallum, Dir. Gen., MI5 & Chris Wray, Dir., FBI, Joint
Address by MI5 and FBI Heads (July 6, 2022), https://perma.cc/A5YM-7BMZ.
46. See Marty Hu, The Great Firewall: A Technical Perspective, TORFOX:
A STAN. PROJECT (May 30, 2011), https://perma.cc/M6PB-S9Z2 (explaining the
basic technical features of the Great Firewall including internet protocol
blocking, address misdirection, and—most pertinent to our analysis—data
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cyber sovereignty philosophy has veiled effects on companies
whose operations involve PRC-controlled infrastructure or
markets.47 Subsumed within the cyber sovereignty philosophy is
another
dictum
that
guides
PRC
regulatory
decision-making—the quest for information domination.
The CCP values informational superiority as a prerogative
for maintaining domestic control and achieving its international
ambitions. In 2003, the PRC promulgated the “Three Warfares”
strategic concept.48 This stratagem, in all its facets, requires
informational
superiority.49
Colloquially,
information
domination involves leveraging technology to disrupt or direct
the narrative surrounding the PRC’s security interests.50 As a
former FBI director testified to Congress, “Ultimately, China
doesn’t hesitate to use smoke, mirrors, and misdirection to
influence Americans.”51 CCP strategy for maintaining control of
the PRC revolves around “creat[ing] an environment of
anonymity, ambiguity, and the confusion and dilemma of ethical
retaliation that Chinese have traditionally dominated.”52 The

filtering); see also Geremie R. Barme & Sang Ye, The Great Firewall of China,
WIRED (June 1, 1997, 12:00 PM), https://perma.cc/3N92-LLRT; see generally
JAMES GRIFFITHS, THE GREAT FIREWALL OF CHINA: HOW TO BUILD AND CONTROL
AN ALTERNATIVE VERSION OF THE INTERNET (2021).
47. See Justin Sherman, How Much Cyber Sovereignty is Too Much Cyber
Sovereignty?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS. (Oct. 30, 2019, 4:00 PM),
https://perma.cc/4SBX-ZHJM.
48. See STEFAN HALPER, CHINA: THE THREE WARFARES 28 (2013),
https://perma.cc/AVC5-G2RG (PDF) (describing the “Three Warfares” as
comprising psychological, media, and legal warfare).
49. See id. (outlining the myriad ways China uses information and
misinformation to achieve its political objectives).
50. See generally CHRISTOPHER WHYTE & BRIAN MAZANEC,
UNDERSTANDING CYBER WARFARE: POLITICS, POLICY AND STRATEGY (2018).
51. Olivia Solon & Ken Dilanian, China’s Influence Operations Offer a
Glimpse into the Future of Information Warfare, NBC NEWS (Oct. 21, 2020,
5:00 AM), https://perma.cc/M65M-8N7Z.
52. Vincent Wei-Cheng Wang, Asymmetric War? Implications for China’s
Information Warfare Strategies, 20 AM. ASIAN REV. 167, 197 (2002),
https://perma.cc/MW97-RQBS (PDF) (commenting on the traditional ThirtySix Strategies: The Secret Art of War and its influence on modern PRC
strategic thinking).
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PRC has expansive regulatory ambitions and these legal
upheavals resist easy classification into public and private
sector efforts. However, information is data aggregated. So, if
information is the objective, data are bricks in the artifice.
C. The PRC’s Rapacious Thirst for Data
The CCP has fenced off the PRC from the rest of the global
internet and fanatically protects access to its markets,
networks, and data. Essentially, the PRC population is an
intentionally designed black box for anyone other than the CCP.
The CCP has greater insight into the PRC population than other
nations can achieve—due in large part to purposeful PRC
infrastructure and network priorities.53 One of the largest
differences inherent to the PRC approach is the blurring of lines
between data available to private-sector companies and data
available to government actors.54 In the post-Snowden age, all
must assume that governments have access to their respective
nation’s private-sector data, especially in the PRC.55 In
evaluating technology both inside and outside the PRC, nations
should not lose sight of the PRC’s focus on what data these
technologies and companies collect, maintain, and store.56 The
tension between the PRC approach to control and western
traditions of openness is paramount to understanding the
greater context of any transaction dealing with citizen data and
PRC access to such data.57

53. See Matt Sheehan, Much Ado About Data: How America and China
Stack Up, MACRO POLO (July 16, 2019), https://perma.cc/2X8Y-L3JM.
54. See Lindsay Gorman, China’s Data Ambitions: Strategy, Emerging
Technologies, and Implications for Democracies, NAT’L BUREAU ASIAN OF RSCH.
(Aug. 14, 2021), https://perma.cc/HE2V-GSKL (“To achieve these goals, the
[PRC] has combined national policy planning and aggressive data-retention
policies with an outgoing effort to export data-based technologies.”).
55. See generally FRED H. CATE & JAMES X. DEMPSEY, BULK COLLECTION:
SYSTEMATIC GOVERNMENT ACCESS TO PRIVATE-SECTOR DATA (2017).
56. See Gorman, supra note 54 (“China’s data ambitions risk normalizing
concepts of state access to citizen data absent independent legal due process.”).
57. See Lizhi Liu, The Rise of Data Politics: Digital China and the World,
56 STUD. COMPAR. INT’L DEV. 45, 45 (2021) (“Chinese tech companies, therefore,
confront a ‘deep versus broad’ dilemma: deep ties with the Chinese
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The PRC wants to collect all possible data from its
adversaries while denying anyone but the CCP access to data
behind the Great Firewall.58 The PRC is collecting rivals’ data
at
an
increasing—almost
exponential—rate.59
Some
PRC-influenced news publications try to differentiate the PRC
approach as defensive in contrast to other countries that also
collect troves of data as part of their information warfare
strategy.60 Propagandic characterizations aside, the data is still
collected, stored, and capable of being used in any possible
fashion.61 If you have the bricks, you can make whatever kind of
house you desire. The overarching philosophy behind PRC data
collection is to further its goal of becoming the supreme world
power.62 Warehousing data allows flexibility to adapt strategy
to new circumstances, so the PRC’s collection of data must be a
government help promote their domestic business but jeopardize their
international expansion.”).
58. See Samantha Hoffman, The U.S.-China Data Fight Is Only Getting
Started, FOREIGN POL’Y (July 22, 2021, 12:40 PM), https://perma.cc/D4AGNAPX (“[W]hat is exceptional is the way the Chinese Communist Party-state
has used such laws—and other tools—to give it ultimate influence over digital
technologies and the flow of data.”).
59. See Cate Cadell, China Harvests Masses of Data on Western Targets,
Documents Show, WASH. POST (Dec. 31, 2021, 5:13 PM), https://perma.cc/J5JBWYUW (“China is turning a major part of its internal Internet-data
surveillance network outward, mining Western social media, including
Facebook and Twitter, to equip its government agencies, military and police
with information on foreign targets.”).
60. See Alex Lo, Why Chinese Information Warfare Is Different from
Those of the US and Russia, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Feb. 7, 2022, 9:00 PM),
https://perma.cc/ZCF6-RJ4K (“Chinese state propaganda is primarily
defensive in nature and aims at pushing the country’s preferred viewpoints
and narratives about itself. Comparable operations by Russia and the United
States are generally offensive as they aim at regime change, political
delegitimisation, and societal and economic destabilisation in the targeted
country.”).
61. See Solon & Dilanian, supra note 51 (quoting the Director General of
MI5 as saying “Russia [is] like bad weather but China [is] a far greater
challenge in the long-term and more like climate change”).
62. See id. (“The goal, experts said, is to develop more influence overseas,
particularly among America’s political and military allies in Southeast Asia,
who have been alienated by President Donald Trump, and to ultimately
replace the U.S. as the dominant world power.”).
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primary concern.63 However, not all data is created equal and
comprehending the values of different datatypes is pivotal to
understanding the PRC’s data obsession.
D. Differing Values of Data
Some data is more valuable than others.64 Certain
datatypes are worth more because they are more easily
monetized.65 Other datatypes provide valuable metrics that
allow advertisers, businesses, and intelligence organizations to
glean insights into individuals or groups.66 While these two
broad categories overlap, there is dissonance between the
datatypes most valuable to cybercriminals and the datatypes
most useful to governments and businesses. Credit card
numbers, bank account information, and other traditional
identity theft data are decidedly in the first category.67 This
information is taken without consent and its primary uses
sound in fraud and theft. On the other hand, the datatypes most
valuable to companies and governments are those that are used
to build analytical, predictive models of individuals and
groups.68 Insight into their customers’ or citizens’ behavior
promotes greater control.69 This control is useful to a company
wishing to grow its revenue as well as a government seeking to
63. See Anthony J. Eastin & Patrick G. Franck, Information Warfare on
United States’ Citizens: How China Weaponized COVID-19, OVER THE HORIZON
(Aug. 28, 2020), https://perma.cc/PCD9-WZVE (explaining that the COVID-19
pandemic caused a shift in PRC information warfare operations).
64. See Ravi Sen, Here’s How Much Your Personal Information Is Worth
to Cybercriminals—and What They Do with It, PBS (May 14, 2021, 12:04 PM),
https://perma.cc/9LHP-NFAE.
65. See Valuing Data Is Hard, SILICON VALLEY DATA SCI. (Nov. 10, 2015),
https://perma.cc/DM7N-BEWF.
66. See generally DELOITTE, DATA VALUATION: UNDERSTANDING THE VALUE
OF YOUR DATA ASSETS (2020), https://perma.cc/H63C-Y35U (PDF).
67. See Facts + Statistics: Identity Theft and Cybercrime, INS. INFO. INST.
(2021), https://perma.cc/P8JZ-FKBA.
68. See Elaine Bennett, Types of Data Every Business Should Collect,
DISRUPT MAG. (2020), https://perma.cc/82LS-YYK4.
69. See Steven Feldstein, We Need to Get Smart About How Governments
Use AI, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE (Jan. 22, 2019),
https://perma.cc/59Y8-QEH8.
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control either its citizens or the citizens of another country.70
Cost of collection and the quality of analysis that a given
datatype yields are two of the biggest determinants for why one
datatype is more valuable than another.71 Viewing past PRC
actions from a data perspective allows better understanding of
what priorities the CCP views as critical to its national security
and policy objectives. Because companies and governments both
covet these types of data, the Three Laws should be of
paramount concern for international, private-sector companies
that collect, manage, or store data valuable to their business
purposes that is also strategically important to the PRC.
III. FINANCIAL DATA CASE STUDY: ANT GROUP’S IPO
On November 3, 2020, the CCP halted the initial public
offering (IPO) of Jack Ma’s Ant Group days before the financial
technology behemoth was scheduled to list on the Shanghai and
Hong Kong stock exchanges.72 Regulators were not forthcoming
about the specific rationale for halting an IPO of one of the
PRC’s largest companies.73 Rumors abounded that Jack Ma, Ant
Group’s billionaire founder, had rankled the CCP with a speech
criticizing the PRC’s financial system and regulations.74 While
the speech might have been the straw that broke the camel’s
back, the true crux of this cataclysmic regulatory action is the

70. See Amanda Evans et al., Four Ways Governments Can Use Data to
Transform Outcomes, EY (Mar. 25, 2021), https://perma.cc/3J4D-C6WC
(“Unlike the private sector, though, governments have no similarly disruptive
‘competitors’ [data-centric service providers such as Netflix and Alibaba] to
provide the spur for change.”).
71. See Gillian MacPherson, Location vs. Transactional Data: Is One
Better?, EPSILON (Apr. 30, 2019), https://perma.cc/B658-NMXH.
72. See Jing Yang & Serena Ng, Ant’s Record IPO Suspended in Shanghai
and Hong Kong Stock Exchanges, WALL ST. J., https://perma.cc/JB83-PLEJ
(last updated Nov. 3, 2020).
73. See id. (“Regulators didn’t go into detail about what led them to pull
the plug on Ant’s IPO.”).
74. See id. (“We cannot regulate the future with yesterday’s
means. . . . There[] [are] no systemic financial risks in China because there’s
no financial system in China. The risks are a lack of systems.”).
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detailed data accumulated as a result of Ant Group’s business
model.
In April 2021, after months of financial technology
companies encountering significant obstacles to listing publicly,
China’s Securities Regulatory Commission issued new
guidelines for companies that wanted to list on PRC
exchanges.75 Rumors and guesses circulated as experts
struggled to understand the PRC regulatory policy.76 These
theories ranged from assuming that the PRC was protecting its
state-owned banks—giving the banks time to create their own
competitive financial technology operations—to CCP paranoia
about losing control to a bevy of billionaire technology
entrepreneurs.77 This abrupt intervention in a prestigious PRC
private-sector economic achievement is perhaps best explained
by future developments that might elucidate PRC fears of
technology companies and the data these companies collect,
analyze, and use. One of the plausible explanations for this
regulatory shift is a PRC focus on protecting Chinese citizens’
financial data.78 Indeed, the overarching question becomes:
“What made the PRC willing to cut one of its crown jewel private
sector companies down at the knees?”
Article 28 of the PIPL provides examples of various types of
information that fall within its ambit.79 Financial account
information is explicitly listed therein.80 Even assuming the
entire Ant Group crackdown was solely an attempt to weaken
billionaire Jack Ma, the PRC has 625 other publicly-known
75. See Eustance Huang, China’s Fintech Giants Are Hitting Roadblocks
in Planned Listings at Home, CNBC (Apr. 23, 2021, 12:49 AM),
https://perma.cc/Y5KL-NT6F.
76. See VIVIANA ZHU, INSTITUT MONTAIGNE, CHINA’S FINTECH: THE END OF
THE WILD WEST 25–28 (Apr. 2021), https://perma.cc/A3Z7-G7GJ (PDF).
77. See supra notes 72–76 and accompanying text; see also China’s
Regulators Vow ‘Special’ Oversight of Fintech Giants, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 30,
2020, 8:37 AM), https://perma.cc/GW3C-QX5P (last updated Nov. 30, 2020
11:05 PM).
78. See Lingling Wei, Chinese Regulators Try to Get Jack Ma’s Ant Group
to Share Customer Data, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 5, 2021, 3:33 PM),
https://perma.cc/8ECX-3HNN.
79. See supra Part I.B.
80. See supra Part I.B.
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billionaires.81 The context of the crackdown on Jack Ma and Ant
Group sheds light on the PRC’s desire to control the financial
information of its citizens.82 If Jack Ma’s speech was in response
to regulators wanting more control over the financial data
inherent to Ant Group’s business model, then the motivation for
quashing the Ant Group IPO is truly a CCP desire for financial
control. If so, then how is BlackRock, the first foreign firm to be
allowed to offer mutual fund products to PRC citizens,83 going to
navigate the PRC’s protectionism regarding its citizens’
financial information?84 Further, there are many companies
that sell transaction data, cultivated either from their
proprietary applications or as the terms for providing back-end
software to financial institutions.85 Will these companies be
81. See Giacomo Tognini, The Countries with the Most Billionaires 2021,
FORBES (Apr. 6, 2021, 6:00 AM), https://perma.cc/8X9V-DHFE (“[N]early half
of the individuals on Forbes’ World’s Billionaires list hail from the U.S. and
China.”).
82. See Eswar Prasad, Jack Ma Taunted China. Then Came His Fall,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2021), https://perma.cc/8YPY-LAB8 (“Chinese regulators
trying to assess financial risks on Ant’s books had been brushed off by Mr. Ma.
In an audacious speech, he criticized regulators as too cautious and pilloried
state-owned banks for their ‘pawnshop’ mentality of providing loans only to
borrowers who could post collateral.”).
83. See Jing Yang & Dawn Lim, BlackRock Raises $1 Billion for First
Chinese Mutual Fund Run by Foreign Firm, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 7, 2021),
https://perma.cc/R9XB-VE8M (“BlackRock was the first firm given full
approval to sell mutual funds of its own to Chinese individuals. It is so far the
only foreign firm with that distinction.”). But see George Soros, BlackRock’s
China Blunder, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 6, 2021, 11:42 AM), https://perma.cc/YVT4Q6BP (“[BlackRock] appears to misunderstand President Xi Jinping’s
China.”).
84. BlackRock’s foray into the PRC market is a developing issue and
would provide an excellent case study for further research and analysis, but is
unfortunately out of scope for this Note due to the recency of their market
entry.
85. See,
e.g.,
Access
Detailed
Transaction
History,
PLAID,
https://perma.cc/P8RY-FYHG (advertising Plaid’s transaction data services);
Transaction Data Enrichment, an Opportunity for Financial Wellness,
ENVESTNET YODLEE, https://perma.cc/J63U-3WTC (advertising transaction
data access and data enrichment services, which would add datapoints to
financial institutions’ own customer databases, providing greater fidelity and
insight).
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subject to the broad and extraterritorial restrictions of the Three
Laws even if they do not operate in the PRC?86
IV. LOCATION DATA
A. Didi Cybersecurity Review
On June 30, 2021, Didi-Chuxing (“Didi”), a PRC version of
Uber, debuted on the New York Stock Exchange.87 Days later,
the CAC suspended new users from registering for the PRC’s
largest ride-sharing company.88 Eventually, Didi’s apps were
removed from PRC app stores and the company was ordered to
comply with a full cybersecurity review.89 In response to this
multi-billion-dollar tumult, the United States Securities and
Exchange Commission temporarily halted approval of any
future listings of PRC companies on United States exchanges.90
Undoubtedly, the widespread investor frustration over CCP
interference imploding the Didi IPO motivated this pause.91 In
the weeks after the Didi IPO, the CAC proposed new regulations
requiring companies wanting to list overseas to pass a national
security review regarding how user data is handled in
advance.92 Didi shares then further plummeted after rumors
spread that PRC regulators were asking the firm to delist from
the U.S. exchange.93
86. See infra Part VIII.
87. See Paul R. La Monica, SEC Temporarily Halts Approvals of New
Chinese IPOs After Didi Debacle, CNN, https://perma.cc/8RUE-9EBU (last
updated Aug. 2, 2021, 12:37 AM).
88. See Moira Ritter, Didi Stock Tumbles After China Suspends
Registration of New Users, CNN, https://perma.cc/77C5-X9LD (last updated
July 2, 2021, 10:58 AM).
89. See John Ruwitch, China Removed Didi from App Stores, Accused the
Company of Violating Security Rules, NPR: ALL THINGS CONSIDERED (July 12,
2021, 4:20 PM), https://perma.cc/VB54-WSGW.
90. See supra notes 87–89 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 87–89 and accompanying text.
92. See Jane Li, Meet the New Gatekeeper for Chinese Tech Firms Seeking
to IPO in the US, QUARTZ (July 15, 2021), https://perma.cc/JN3L-PFJL.
93. See Arjun Kharpal, Didi Shares Sink on a Report that Chinese
Regulators Have Asked It to Delist from U.S., CNBC, https://perma.cc/Z4BKJK5D (last updated Nov. 26, 2021, 1:01 PM) (“The Cyberspace Administration
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The Didi cybersecurity review and New York Stock
Exchange delisting had deleterious effects on the company’s
business, including twenty percent of its employees being laid
off, plummeting daily active users, and a two-thirds drop from
its debut IPO share price.94 In June of 2022, in what some
commentators ascribed to a desire to spur economic activity in
tough times, the CCP concluded the security audit and allowed
Didi back onto app stores and new users to enroll.95 Days later,
Didi’s delisting from the New York Stock Exchange was
completed.96 Subsequently, the CCP announced that the
cybersecurity review was concluding, a $1 billion fine would be
assessed, and Didi’s apps would be allowed to continue to enroll
new users.97 In total, billions of dollars and thousands of jobs
had evaporated, and yet it was still not completely clear what
had rankled the CCP enough to kneecap one of its most valuable
companies.98 While the Ant Group brouhaha appeared to revolve
around financial data, this calamitous CCP regulatory action
centered on a company with some of the best possible location
data on PRC citizens.99 As manufacturers add technology to
their vehicles every year, location data is not just limited to
ride-sharing companies but all vehicles that rely on
of China has asked Didi to work out the details for a delisting which will be
subject to government approval.”).
94. See Coco Feng, Didi Chuxing Starts Companywide Layoffs Amid
Unresolved Cybersecurity Probe, Ongoing Delisting in New York, S. CHINA
MORNING POST (Feb. 15, 2022, 2:30 PM), https://perma.cc/MP7U-V5XY.
95. Keith Zhai & Liza Lin, China to Conclude Didi Cybersecurity Probe,
Lift Ban on New Users, WALL ST. J. (June 6, 2022), https://perma.cc/5UCQQHEL.
96. Jing Yang & Dave Sebastian, Didi Ends Tumultuous Run as a New
York-Listed Company, WALL ST. J. (June 10, 2022), https://perma.cc/JED2SVSZ.
97. See Keith Zhai & Liza Lin, Chinese Regulator to Fine Didi More Than
$1 Billion over Data-Security Breaches, WALL ST. J. (July 19, 2022),
https://perma.cc/RGK7-8P4L.
98. See supra notes 90–93 and accompanying text.
99. See Heather Somerville, The Answer to Uber’s Profit Challenge? It
May Lie in Its Trove of Data, REUTERS (May 9, 2019, 4:07 AM),
https://perma.cc/RV62-NWE6 (remarking on the value of the “treasure trove
of trip data” in advance of Uber’s IPO).
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microprocessors, wireless signals, and connectivity—which is
steadily becoming most modern automobiles.
B. Smart Vehicles
Modern vehicles are connected to the internet and collect
data to function—electric and self-driving vehicles collect even
more.100 These types of vehicles function by persistently
amassing varied, detailed data that reveals far more than
simple location, including video, radar, and other specialized
datatypes.101 The PRC has significant security concerns over
vehicle data leaving mainland China.102 It banned officials from
owning Tesla vehicles and the vehicles themselves from
entering sensitive government areas.103 In light of increased
PRC regulatory attention, Tesla has undertaken several
measures to appease the PRC and hopefully thereby maintain
access to the lucrative market.

100. See Cara Bloom et al., Self-Driving Cars and Data Collection: Privacy
Perceptions of Networked Autonomous Vehicles, USENIX (July 14, 2017),
https://perma.cc/PS38-ZG75 (PDF); see also Autonomous Car Data: Future
Cars Run on Data, Not Gasoline, SUMMA LINGUAE, https://perma.cc/43HXQFT8 (last updated July 26, 2021).
101. See Andrew J. Hawkins, Waymo Is Disclosing More Autonomous
Vehicle Data for Research Purposes, THE VERGE (Mar. 10, 2021, 10:00 AM),
https://perma.cc/PUX3-7RFA (describing Google’s self-driving vehicle
subsidiary Waymo’s dataset and its pertinent datatypes).
102. See Eamon Barrett, Tesla Just Had Its Best Month Ever in
China— But a New Data Law Looms Large, FORTUNE (Oct. 12, 2021, 5:59 AM),
https://perma.cc/66KY-9GM9 (reporting on the DSL prompting PRC
regulators to assess the types of data smart vehicles collect and transfer
overseas).
103. See Shunsuke Tabeta, China Clamps Down on Auto Data Collection
by Tesla and Others, NIKKEI (May 13, 2021, 3:59 AM), https://perma.cc/NYC7YV92.
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Tesla initially enjoyed remarkable success in the PRC
market.104 However, Tesla soon encountered obstacles.105 In
2021, state-run media airwaves broadcasted accusations of
safety concerns leading to high-profile protests and eventually a
“recall of almost all the cars Tesla has ever sold in the
[PRC]—more than 285,000 in all—to address a software
flaw.”106 The onslaught of protests, the lack of censorship on
social media, and unfavorable treatment by state-run media
prompted observers to suspect that the CCP was supportive
of—if not involved in—Tesla’s public relations kerfuffle.107
Allegations of safety concerns, spurious or otherwise, and their
rampant spread on social media could be cynically characterized
as a CCP tactic to rein in a foreign corporation—a foreign
corporation that jumpstarted the PRC electric vehicle market
but was also jeopardizing the PRC data objective of keeping all
PRC citizen data out of the clutches of foreign nations.108 The
CCP quickly enacted laws that would solidify its control over the
detailed data collected by smart vehicles.

104. See Tesla’s Fall From Grace in China Shows Perils of Betting on
Beijing, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, https://perma.cc/Z9H7-CG5H (last
updated July 6, 2021, 5:01 AM) (reporting on Tesla’s early success in the PRC,
including “receiving red-carpet treatment from government officials, who
granted Tesla the unprecedented concession of allowing it to wholly control its
local subsidiary, . . . substantial assistance building its Shanghai facility and
helping it reopen rapidly after the nationwide coronavirus shutdown”).
105. See id. (“Until recently, the unspoken bargain between Musk and
Beijing seemed relatively clear: in exchange for state support, the company
would use its brand and high-tech expertise to attract Chinese consumers to
electric vehicles, while pushing local manufacturers of EVs and components to
up their game.”).
106. See id. (“[Tesla’s recent difficulties] . . . provide[] compelling evidence
of how fraught operating in China can be, even for those who appear to enjoy
every possible advantage.”).
107. See id. (“But the [protestor]’s presence at the high-security ticketed
event—and the fact that images of her circulated uncensored on social
networks—prompted industry observers to wonder whether officials were
quietly supportive of her actions.”).
108. See generally SCOTT W. HERALD ET AL., CHINESE DISINFORMATION
EFFORTS ON SOCIAL MEDIA (2021), https://perma.cc/52QP-Z9HG (PDF).
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In April 2021, the PRC proposed regulations focused on
automobile data storage.109 Tesla sought to address the PRC’s
concerns by constructing a PRC data center so that any
domestically-collected data would remain in the PRC and under
CCP control.110 Even with the data center constructed, the PRC
remains concerned about the data Tesla vehicles collect.111
Other foreign automobile manufacturers also have kept their
user data inside the PRC, thus adversely affecting overseas
technology development.112 The CCP’s data focus will remain a
costly problem for vehicle manufacturers who want to access the
world’s largest automobile market.113 Vehicle data provides
analytical insights about their drivers and the CCP is equally
concerned about companies collecting data about PRC citizens.
V.

HEALTH DATA

Currently, health data is one of the most precious
datatypes. Health data is immensely valuable, especially when
compared to other datatypes, but privacy concerns and different
109. See Eamon Barrett, Tesla Changes Its China Data Policy After
(May
26,
2021,
6:18
AM),
Government
Scrutiny,
FORTUNE
https://perma.cc/F3C7-XGZA (reporting on the automobile-specific regulations
that “require[] automakers to store user data in China and obtain special
permission to send any data abroad”).
110. See Trefor Moss, Tesla to Store China Data Locally in New Data
Center, WALL ST. J. (May 26, 2021, 3:43 AM), https://perma.cc/29ZT-5JNP.
111. See China Develops Machines that Can Track Data Sent Abroad by
Cars, REUTERS (Sept. 14, 2021, 10:02 AM), https://perma.cc/5JFY-MWBX
(reporting on technological efforts to curtail extraterritorial data transfers out
of the PRC).
112. See Yilei Sun & Tony Munroe, EXCLUSIVE As China Plans New
Rules, Global Automakers Move to Store Car Data Locally, REUTERS (May 27,
2021, 10:08 AM), https://perma.cc/M9TZ-AJFM (“BMW, Daimler and Ford
have set up facilities in China to store data generated by their cars
locally . . . as automakers come under growing pressure in the world’s biggest
car market over how they handle information from vehicles.”); see also
Shunsuke Tabeta, China Data Rules to Squeeze Overseas Development of
Self-Driving Tech, NIKKEI (Aug. 22, 2021, 1:26 AM), https://perma.cc/2JHPYLQ5 (predicting that PRC regulations mean “information generated in [the
PRC] will mostly stay within the country”).
113. See Anjani Trivedi, China Targets the Troves of Data Collected by
Electric Vehicles, TAIPEI TIMES (July 25, 2021), https://perma.cc/QZY8-8T34.
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nations’ healthcare infrastructures make market valuations
difficult.114 One valuation method is to examine the prices that
health data yields in cybercrime markets.115 In addition to using
cybercrime analogs, health data is valued by using efficiency
gains and measuring improvements in analytical fidelity.116
Regardless of valuation methodology, it is remarkable that a
health record is often fifty times more valuable than a stolen
credit card.117 Recognizing the value of health data, some
companies—like 23andMe—rely on such data almost
exclusively in their business model.118
A. 23andMe
The genetic testing company 23andMe has faced persistent
concerns over data security since 2013.119 For years, privacy
considerations were the biggest roadblock to 23andMe
conducting a public offering.120 Experts argue that 23andMe has

114. See Life Sciences Industry, EY, https://perma.cc/AUK2-44RR.
115. See Ellen Neveux, Hackers, Breaches, and the Value of Healthcare
Data, SECURELINK (June 30, 2021), https://perma.cc/Q2XR-HDAB (last
updated Oct. 1, 2021).
116. See How Global Data Flows Can Unlock the Value of Health Data,
HEALTHCARE IT NEWS (June 21, 2021, 10:21 AM), https://perma.cc/PKN9-F75C
(arguing that “enhanced patient care, more efficient health systems and
advanced research models” drive the true value of healthcare data).
117. See Will Maddox, Why Medical Data is 50 Times More Valuable Than
a Credit Card, D MAG. (Oct. 15, 2019, 11:09 PM), https://perma.cc/98YK-8D4Q.
118. See Marcy Darnovsky, 23andMe’s Dangerous Business Model, N.Y.
TIMES, https://perma.cc/UG9E-G38C (last updated Mar. 2, 2015, 3:30 AM)
(“[23andMe’s] business model depends on packaging and reselling its
customers’ genetic data and other information.”).
119. See Charles Seife, 23andMe Is Terrifying, but Not for the Reasons the
FDA Thinks, SCI. AM. (Nov. 27, 2013), https://perma.cc/QAQ3-8RLY; see also
Kendra T, 23andMe: Losing at Digital Privacy, HARV. BUS. SCH. (Feb. 11,
2020), https://perma.cc/4BBS-RE8U.
120. See Kari Paul, Fears over DNA Privacy as 23andMe Plans to Go
Public in Deal with Richard Branson, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 9, 2021, 4:54 PM),
https://perma.cc/6U7L-ECCT.
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two business models—one targeting consumers and the other
aimed at selling customer data to researchers.121
When 23andMe finally went public, one of the company’s
investors presented a preliminary outline of the CEO’s vision.122
This vision depended on gaining a critical mass of users
providing their genetic information, resulting in a database of
DNA information.123 In 2018, the company entered a $300
million deal with a drug manufacturer to use its DNA data for
health and pharmaceutical research.124 In so doing, 23andMe
signaled its readiness to use its database for research and
development, thereby tacitly acknowledging that its database
purportedly yields insights into the health of its users and, in
the aggregate, can inform scientific progress. 23andMe has PRC
investors, but the CEO has stated that “Chinese investors have
no access to the genetic information of the company’s
customers.”125 Curiously, the 23andMe CEO also stated that her
biggest concern is the PRC “very publicly stating that they
wanna [sic] win in the genetic information revolution.”126

121. See Henri-Corto Stoeklé et al., 23andMe: A New Two-Sided
MED.
ETHICS
(2016),
Data-Banking
Market
Model,
BMC
https://perma.cc/N3BY-N9QM (PDF) (highlighting the likelihood that
23andMe’s business objectives are “two-fold: promoting itself within the
market for predictive testing . . . at a low cost to consumers, and establishing
a high-value database/biobank for research”).
122. See Kristen V. Brown, All Those 23andMe Spit Tests Were Part of a
Bigger Plan, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 4, 2021, 5:00 AM),
https://perma.cc/JJM6-BWUN.
123. See id. (“[I]t wouldn’t be crazy for the 8.8 million 23andMe customers
who once absently checked a box saying yeah, sure, use my data for whatever,
to feel like they’ve been bait-and-switched now that their genes are laying the
groundwork for potential cancer cures.”).
124. See Jamie Ducharme, A Major Drug Company Now Has Access to
23andMe’s Genetic Data. Should You Be Concerned?, TIME (July 26, 2018, 3:47
PM), https://perma.cc/F6NX-X7BG.
125. See Jon Wertheim, Companies and Foreign Countries Vying for Your
Data, 60 MINUTES (Jan. 31, 2021), https://perma.cc/77CL-52VX (denying a
data sharing agreement with Chinese investors but emphasizing “the Chinese
threat to U.S. biotech is real”).
126. Id.
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Due to the PIPL’s explicit proscription on biometric and
health data,127 the PRC’s avowed goal to “win in the genetic
information revolution,” and privacy concerns in the U.S., any
collection of genetic or health data will fall squarely within the
“rights of PRC citizens” and almost certainly draw the ire of PRC
regulators.128 The Three Laws may force 23andMe to either
comply with oppressive data regulations that de facto cede
control over its data to the CCP or bar PRC citizens from
purchasing its products. But DNA testing companies are not the
only companies to offer products that collect users’ health data.
B. Wearable Technology and Fitness Trackers
Wearable fitness trackers, such as Google’s Fitbit products
or an Apple Watch, collect biometric data on wearers.129 The
Chinese military has voiced concerns that wearables may pose
a national security risk if worn by military personnel.130 This
data is not just managed by the device maker, but is often linked
and shared with other companies, sometimes resulting in
large-scale data breaches.131 Fitness trackers collect a
cornucopia of valuable data. Indeed, regulators’ objections to

127. See supra Part I.B.
128. See supra Part I.
129. See Do Fitness Trackers Put Your Privacy at Risk?, KASPERSKY,
https://perma.cc/3J6D-3VAH (providing a high-level overview of fitness
tracker data collection and the datatypes wearables collect including “weight,
blood pressure, what distances you run or walk, your heart or lung function,
your menstrual cycle, your sleep patterns”).
130. See China Says Wearable Tech Could Leak Secrets, CYBER SEC. INTEL.
(May 20, 2015), https://perma.cc/U4X7-HSJ5 (reporting on the publication in
the People’s Liberation Army Daily of concerns that “[t]he moment a soldier
puts on a device that can record high-definition audio and video, take photos,
and process and transmit data, it’s very possible for him or her to be tracked
or to reveal military secrets”).
131. See Heather Landi, Fitbit, Apple User Data Exposed in Breach
Impacting 61M Fitness Tracker Records, FIERCE HEALTHCARE (Sept. 13, 2021,
4:21 PM), https://perma.cc/E8HR-EJ95 (reporting on a data breach of a
third-party data aggregator that allows its users to sync across different
fitness tracker platforms that could “make[] it much easier for bad actors to
locate where people are living or staying, and can expose patterns of travel”).
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Google’s acquisition of Fitbit demonstrate the value of this data
to online advertising and other private sector industries.132 One
of the most popular wearables is the Apple Watch.133 Apple’s
PRC presence provides excellent insight into how one of the
world’s largest companies navigates selling a product reliant on
rich, arguably invasive, data collection in an oppressive
regulatory environment.
“[J]ust as [current Apple CEO Tim] Cook figured out how to
make China work for Apple, China is making Apple work for the
Chinese government.”134 Apple is by far the most successful
American company in the PRC, generating over $55 billion a
year in revenue from the country and assembling nearly all of
its products in Chinese factories.135 The CCP has extracted
many concessions from Apple as the company attempts to
balance this critical relationship and avoid the ire of the CCP.136
For instance, to comply with PRC law and maintain its lucrative
and dominant PRC market share, all of Apple’s PRC customer
data is stored inside the PRC.137
Apple has ceded control to PRC authorities over managing
its data center, what encryption is used in the PRC, and—in

132. See Argam Artashyan, Google’s Acquisition of Fitbit Transaction
(July
4,
2020),
Raises
Data
Collection
Concerns,
GIZCHINA
https://perma.cc/849A-U9GK (reporting on the EU and Australian regulatory
concerns that “[b]uying Fitbit will allow Google to build an even more
comprehensive set of user data, further cementing its position and raising
barriers to entry to potential rivals”).
133. See Nick Statt, Apple Now Sells More Watches Than the Entire Swiss
Watch Industry, THE VERGE (Feb. 5, 2020, 7:39 PM), https://perma.cc/D5AYC9RA.
134. Jack Nicas et al., Censorship, Surveillance and Profits: A Hard
Bargain for Apple in China, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2021),
https://perma.cc/DNP3-QDLY (last updated June 17, 2021).
135. See id. (emphasizing Apple’s “high profile and acute dependence on
the [PRC]”).
136. See id. (outlining Apple’s compromises in the PRC including removing
“Designed by Apple in California” from its iPhones, and other ways that Apple
has “put the data of its Chinese customers at risk and has aided government
censorship in the Chinese version of its App Store”).
137. See id. (“Cook agreed to move the personal data of his Chinese
customers to the servers of a Chinese state-owned company. That led to a
project known inside Apple as ‘Golden Gate.’”).
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violation of sound cybersecurity principles—it has made the
encryption keys as easily accessible as possible.138 To avoid U.S.
laws prohibiting American companies from turning over data to
PRC law enforcement, Apple does not even own its PRC
customer data.139 By allowing a PRC state-owned company to
own Apple customer data, the PRC is able to request data from
the PRC company and Apple can avoid running afoul of the U.S.
laws that prohibit Apple from complying with these data
requests themselves.140 “[If] Chinese intelligence has physical
control over your hardware—that’s basically a threat level you
can’t let it get to.”141 Apple rebuts concerns about PRC
authorities having physical control by emphasizing that its
encryption makes illegitimate access impossible.142 However,
PRC law requires approval of any encryption standard and
expert opinions say that housing the encryption keys inside the
PRC—even worse, in the same building as the encrypted data—
drastically increases the likelihood of the CCP accessing both

138. See id. (“Chinese state employees physically manage the computers.
Apple abandoned the encryption technology it used elsewhere after China
would not allow it. And the digital keys that unlock information on those
computers are stored in the data centers they’re meant to secure.”).
139. See id. (“Apple has ceded legal ownership of its customers’ data to
Guizhou-Cloud Big Data, or GCBD, a company owned by the government of
Guizhou province, and Apple’s iCloud terms and conditions lists GCBD as
‘service provider’ and Apple as ‘an additional party.’”).
140. See id. (“Apple believes [Chinese authorities asking GCBD—not
Apple—for Apple customers’ data] gives it a legal shield from American law.”);
see also Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2523
(providing the statutory framework for international law enforcement data
sharing); DOJ, PROMOTING PUBLIC SAFETY, PRIVACY, AND THE RULE OF LAW
AROUND THE WORLD: THE PURPOSE AND IMPACT OF THE CLOUD ACT (Apr. 2019),
https://perma.cc/33ZK-UPVA (PDF) (explaining the legislative intent and
ramifications of the CLOUD Act).
141. Nicas, supra note 134 (quoting Matthew D. Green, a cryptography
professor at Johns Hopkins University).
142. See id. (quoting Apple as saying that its iCloud security is designed
“in such a way that only Apple has control of the encryption keys”).
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the encryption keys and the customer data those keys are
supposed to protect.143
Apple also provides user data to law enforcement in the
United States.144 The higher number of instances in which Apple
provides data to U.S. law enforcement may indicate that the
PRC does not need to request the data from Apple because it
already possesses the data as a result of the structure and
ownership of Apple’s data centers in the PRC.145 A new
compromise is on the horizon as the PRC wants Apple to store
more of its user data inside the country, arguably making the
data even more accessible to PRC authorities through
extrajudicial means.146
Apple’s compromises demonstrate that even the world’s
largest companies are not exempt from the PRC’s ravenous data
zealotry. Apple’s concessions are concerning from privacy and
human rights perspectives and are equally indicative of the
economic barriers to entry that the PRC’s data regulations
create. Smaller, less successful companies who wish to operate
in the PRC may lack Apple’s budget to build localized data
centers or the negotiating power of one of the world’s largest
companies, and would likely be completely beholden to the
whims of the CCP if they wish to do business inside one of the
world’s largest markets. Apple’s products collect mountains of
various types of data that add up to greater than the sum of
their parts, and the CCP focus on controlling this treasure trove
demonstrates both the value of the aggregated data and the
CCP’s recognition thereof.
143. See id. (quoting Ross J. Anderson, University of Cambridge
cybersecurity researcher, as saying, “I’m convinced that [the PRC] will have
the ability to break into [Apple’s] servers”).
144. See id. (“[F]rom 2013 through June 2020, Apple said it turned over
the contents of iCloud accounts to U.S. authorities in 10,781 separate cases [as
compared to Apple providing] the contents of an undisclosed number of iCloud
accounts to the [PRC] government in nine cases and challeng[ing] just three
government requests.”).
145. See id. (“[T]he [PRC] government has two avenues to [Apple]
data[:] demand it—or take it without asking.”).
146. See U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, 2022 INVESTMENT CLIENT STATEMENTS:
CHINA (2022), https://perma.cc/NSX4-M39H (remarking that the Three Laws
will increase the CCP’s data localization campaign).
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VI. AGGREGATED DATA
A solitary datapoint may provide some insights. By
combining multiple datapoints, however, that insight can be
honed and made increasingly prescient. Combining data from
multiple sources is a tactic utilized by both the public and
private sector to increase data’s value and accuracy. Recent
events indicate that the CCP assuredly understands this
concept—and in fact is pursuing it as a national security
priority.
A. Grindr and OPM
Combining different data sources and types can often result
in greater utility than the sum of the individual data.
Companies and governments are increasingly focused on the
risks that such aggregated data presents. On September 30,
2021, the board of Five9, a cloud contact-center company,
disapproved a merger with the PRC-linked teleconferencing
company Zoom.147 The Five9 board did so on the heels of reports
that U.S. regulators were evaluating the national security
implications of a merger involving Zoom due to its entrenched
PRC links.148 Zoom’s relevance and prevalence during the
COVID-19 pandemic were accompanied by warnings about the
teleconferencing application’s data privacy and usage.149
Teleconferencing data—who calls whom, for how long, etc.—is
obviously valuable data. This importance is exemplified by the
147. See Joe Williams, Zoom’s Contact-Center Future Is on Hold After the
Five9 Fallout, PROTOCOL (Oct. 1, 2021), https://perma.cc/3AL9-ZRKT.
148. See Jordan Novet, U.S. Committee Is Reviewing Zoom’s $14.7 Billion
Deal for Five9 on National-Security Grounds, CNBC (Sept. 21, 2021, 4:04 PM),
https://perma.cc/C6E8-3FU2 (“USDOJ believes that such [national security]
risk may be raised by the foreign participation (including the foreign
relationships and ownership) associated with the application . . . .”).
149. See Shannon Bond, A Must for Millions, Zoom Has a Dark Side—and
an FBI Warning, NPR (Apr. 3, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://perma.cc/E7WR-QZXD
(reporting on Zoom’s privacy issues and how a former NSA analyst describes
the software as “[t]hings you just would like to have in a chat and video
application—strong encryption, strong privacy controls, strong security—just
seem to be completely missing”).
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fact that wiretapping, which yields similar datapoints, has been
illegal for years prior to the advent of the internet.150 By only
evaluating obviously valuable datatypes, however, nations
would be shortsightedly attempting to stem the tide of PRC data
chicanery.
For any given datatype, countries must evaluate how
aggregated datasets add up to greater than the sum of their
individual datapoints. In 2019, the Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States (CFIUS) ordered a PRC
company to sell its ownership stake in Grindr, a dating
application catering to the LGBTQ+ community.151 Because the
sensitive Grindr data would be available to PRC governmental
entities, the opportunity for PRC malfeasance and blackmail is
readily apparent. Comparing and aggregating datasets can
astronomically increase the likelihood of exposure and
deanonymization.
In 2015, reports surfaced that the United States Office of
Personnel Management (OPM) had been hacked, exposing the
records of nearly all civilian government employees—including
any applications submitted for security clearances.152 U.S.
authorities attributed this breach to PRC-affiliated hackers.153
The OPM hack yielded a wealth of data on nearly all former and
current federal government employees, and this intelligence
was squarely under PRC control.154 Cumulatively, the OPM and
150. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510–2523.
151. See Georgia Wells & Kate O’Keeffe, U.S. Orders Chinese Firm to Sell
Dating App Grindr over Blackmail Risk, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 27, 2019, 6:43 PM),
https://perma.cc/553J-G9SY (reporting on the forced sale amid “the risk that
the personal data it collects could be exploited by Beijing to blackmail
individuals with security clearances”).
152. See Garrett M. Graff, China’s Hacking Spree Will Have a
Decades-Long
Fallout,
WIRED
(Feb.
11,
2020,
2:58
PM),
https://perma.cc/RGM3-RSHS (“Some of the biggest hacks of Americans’
private data in the past decade had been the work of the Chinese government,
resulting in massive, unparalleled espionage advantage[s].”).
153. See id. (“Then-director of national security James Clapper named the
[PRC] as the ‘leading suspect.’”).
154. See id. (quoting Attorney General Barr as saying that “this data has
economic value, and these thefts can feed China’s development of artificial
intelligence tools as well as the creation of intelligence targeting packages”).
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Grindr data combined to alert CFIUS and other U.S.
government agencies tasked with protecting national security to
a potential exposure threat.155
Historically, governments have considered many factors in
granting security clearances, including sexual orientation,
particularly if closeted.156 Since Grindr has granular data over
the messages, locations, sexual orientations, and even sexual
health of its users, this Grindr database could augment the
hacked OPM data. Combining the OPM and Grindr data would
“create a database of the Social Security numbers, fingerprints
and compromising photographs of thousands of gay U.S.
government employees.”157 Regardless of one’s stance on
whether sexual preference increases the likelihood of blackmail,
CFIUS’s order for the PRC company to sell its Grindr stake
reflects that data-constructed blackmail is likely a concern when
evaluating PRC access to private sector and U.S. citizen data.158
Unfortunately, the torrid pace of PRC data theft and collection
has not slowed.
B. Equifax
In 2017, Equifax, one of the main U.S. credit reporting
companies, disclosed that the personal information of 143
million Americans under its control had been breached,
including Social Security numbers and granular information

155. See Carl O’Donnell et al., Exclusive: Told U.S. Security at Risk,
Chinese Firm Seeks to Sell Grindr Dating App, REUTERS (Mar. 27, 2019, 1:02
AM), https://perma.cc/SNJ5-97CU (“CFIUS’ specific concerns and whether any
attempt was made to mitigate them could not be learned. The United States
has been increasingly scrutinizing app developers over the safety of personal
data they handle, especially if some of it involves U.S. military or intelligence
personnel.”).
156. See Gregory B. Lewis, Barriers to Security Clearances for Gay Men
and Lesbians: Fear of Blackmail or Fear of Homosexuals?, 11 J. PUB. ADMIN
539, 540–45 (2001).
157. Isaac Stone Fish, Opinion, China Has Access to Grindr Activity. We
Should All Be Worried, WASH. POST (Apr. 9, 2019), https://perma.cc/8NSLTU57.
158. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
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about their financial situations.159 In 2020, the United States
Department of Justice charged four PRC military personnel
with perpetrating the hack.160 The PRC expectedly denied
involvement.161 The Equifax data has significant value to
foreign intelligence agencies wishing to identify people who are
in dire financial straits and therefore susceptible to potential
bribery.162 Additionally, identifying people susceptible to bribery
in the private sector could be an avenue for intellectual property
theft.163 Pairing the 147 million Equifax records with the 21.5
million OPM records would provide a fulsome list of people with
security clearances and their financial status.164 Bribery and
blackmail are favorite tactics of intelligence agencies.165 The
PRC has paid scientists in the hopes of pilfering their knowledge

159. See Pete Schroeder, Equifax to Pay up to $650 Million in Data Breach
Settlement, REUTERS (July 22, 2019), https://perma.cc/EVP5-Z494 (“‘This
company’s ineptitude, negligence, and lax security standards endangered the
identities of half the U.S. population,’ New York Attorney General Letitia
James said in a statement.”).
160. See U.S. Charges Four Chinese Military Hackers in 2017 Equifax
Breach, REUTERS (Feb. 10, 2020, 10:24 AM), https://perma.cc/A9AV-54ZD
(quoting a former White House cybersecurity coordinator as saying that “the
Equifax hack fits into a pattern of past Chinese cyberattacks . . . because the
stolen data can support other spying efforts”).
161. See id. (“Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Geng Shuang denied
the allegations . . . and said China’s government, military and their personnel
‘never engage in cyber theft of trade secrets.’”).
162. See id. (“[The Equifax data’s] primary utility would be in developing
potential targets for approach by intelligence operatives or feeding artificial
intelligence [and] machine learning tools.”).
163. See Josephine Wolff, That Enormous Equifax Hack Looks a Lot More
Bizarre Now, SLATE (Feb. 11, 2020, 10:57 AM), https://perma.cc/P9RK-PWP4
(commenting on the uncertainty of “[w]hatever the Chinese government plans
to do with this information—whether that’s extortion, identifying people in
precarious financial positions who might be susceptible to bribery, or simply
putting together more comprehensive dossiers on people of interest to them”).
164. See id.
165. See Jackie Northam, Russian Spies’ Go-To Tactics for Entangling
People: Bribery and Blackmail, NPR (Apr. 11, 2017, 2:06 PM),
https://perma.cc/J856-XLA8 (“Loans, payments, sweetheart deals or other
transactions are a tried and tested way that Russia’s spy agencies get access
to or control over people who interest them.”).
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and research.166 The Equifax data identifies who would be the
best target for such tactics, and the OPM data further identifies
those with government secrets who would be susceptible to such
bribery or blackmail.167 The PRC continues in its quest to collect
the best data possible to augment its already ample warehouse
of detailed data on American citizens.
C. Other Alleged PRC Hacking Efforts
In February 2020, then-Attorney General William Barr
publicly attributed some of the largest data breaches of U.S.
companies to PRC efforts to collect personal data on
Americans.168 “China’s hoovering of Americans’ private data has
long been one of the biggest open secrets of modern
intelligence.”169 Hacks of Marriott hotel data and Anthem health
insurance records have been attributed to PRC governmental
entities.170 With access to hotel data, one can surmise who is
staying at what hotel and for how long—yielding powerful
insights. For example, knowledge that a group of executives are
frequently staying at hotels near the headquarters of another
166. See Nate Raymond, Harvard Professor Convicted by U.S. Jury of
Lying About China Ties, REUTERS (Dec. 21, 2021, 8:33 PM),
https://perma.cc/DZ7B-ZR4G (“[The Wuhan University] agreed to pay him up
to $50,000 per month plus $158,000 in living expenses, and he was paid in
cash and deposits to a Chinese bank account, prosecutors said.”).
167. See Christy Cooney, China Accused of Stealing Australian Students’
Data to Blackmail Them, N.Y. POST (June 7, 2019, 3:00 PM),
https://perma.cc/B5YH-YDJV (reporting that the PRC allegedly collected
banking, tax, and academic records to potentially blackmail victims into
committing espionage); Angus Grigg, White House: China’s ‘Digital Dossiers’
to Blackmail and Intimidate, FIN. REV. (Oct. 26, 2020, 12:00 AM),
https://perma.cc/5EU2-NPG6 (“Assembling such ‘dossiers’ [has] always been
part of Leninist regimes and their efforts to influence, humiliate, divide and
blackmail opponents [and] this [has] become far easier in the digital age.”).
168. See Graff, supra note 152 (“For years, we have witnessed China’s
voracious appetite for the personal data of Americans, including the theft of
personnel records from [OPM], the intrusion into Marriott hotels, and Anthem
health insurance company, and now the wholesale theft of credit and other
information from Equifax.”).
169. Id.
170. Id.
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company could signal a potential merger or acquisition.
Alternatively, hotel data coupled with the OPM data could
identify holders of security clearances who are not staying at
their own home, either for professional or personal reasons.
Further, the Marriott hack also involved passport data, which
presents significant privacy concerns for Americans.171 Health
insurer data can yield insights into the health of Americans. “By
combining personnel data with travel records, health records,
and credit information, Chinese intelligence has amassed in just
five years a database more detailed than any nation has ever
possessed about one of its adversaries.”172 The PRC values
American data enough to perpetrate the largest hacks in
history. The Three Laws are their attempt to prevent the same
from being done to them.
VII. ARE THE THREE LAWS ENFORCEABLE? IF SO, HOW?
As the anecdotes above demonstrate, the Three Laws
present monumental compliance tasks for companies. However,
the compliance risks must be balanced against the likelihood
that the Three Laws will be effectively enforced. Companies
must (i) identify which of the Three Laws present the greatest
risk, (ii) understand how courts outside the PRC might view an
extraterritorial penalty, and (iii) understand that the
extraterritorial nature of the Three Laws mandates a global
analysis of PRC influence.
A. The DSL is the Wild Card; the PIPL is Just GDPR With
Chinese Characteristics
If companies already comply with GDPR, they should find
complying with the PIPL easily attainable. The PRC
promulgated the PIPL as companion legislation to the DSL, and

171. See David E. Sanger et al., Marriott Data Breach Is Traced to Chinese
Hackers as U.S. Readies Crackdown on Beijing, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2018),
https://perma.cc/GY4B-6UKF (“[P]assport information would be particularly
valuable in tracking who is crossing borders and what they look like, among
other key data.”).
172. Graff, supra note 152.
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the heavier fines and similarity to the EU’s GDPR has occupied
much of the media discussion on the new PRC data
regulations.173 This focus is misplaced. “If companies are
compliant with Europe’s GDPR, ‘they are going to be fine
complying with [the PIPL].’”174 Companies cite the PRC’s
“increasingly challenging business and legal environment” as
the key motivator to abandoning one of the world’s largest
economies.175 These companies have not exited Europe, so they
ostensibly comply with GDPR.176 GDPR and the PIPL are
analogous and impose similar compliance costs, so if the PIPL is
not the “legal environment” that concerns them, then perhaps
they are deterred by the PRC’s differing views on data and
privacy reflected in the rest of the Three Laws. Indeed, the DSL
and its focus on national security would provide the best insight
into the opaque regulatory framework undergirding the CCP’s
control of the PRC.
Any application of the DSL to inculpate a foreign company
would also likely include allegations of PIPL impropriety. The
broad language of both statutes makes selective and arbitrary
enforcement possible and even likely.177 However, the aspects of
173. See generally Eva Xiao, China Passes One of the World’s Strictest
Data-Privacy Laws, WALL ST. J., https://perma.cc/RGX5-BGDG (last updated
Aug. 20, 2021, 4:55 AM); Catherine Zhu, Is China’s New Personal Information
Privacy Law the New GDPR?, BLOOMBERG L. (Sept. 17, 2021, 4:01 AM),
https://perma.cc/CN9R-E3ZV; Matt Burgess, Ignore China’s New Data Privacy
Law at Your Peril, WIRED (Nov. 5, 2021, 7:00 AM), https://perma.cc/7Y949NSB.
174. Xiao, supra note 173.
175. See, e.g., Nick Turner, Yahoo Quits China in Wake of LinkedIn Exit
as Media Hurdles Grow, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 2, 2021, 9:50 PM),
https://perma.cc/PSN9-3Y4K (“In recognition of the increasingly challenging
business and legal environment in China, Yahoo’s suite of services will no
longer be accessible from mainland China as of Nov. 1.”).
176. See Learn More About the General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR),
LINKEDIN,
https://perma.cc/8NWY-M8XJ; Data
Processing
Agreement, YAHOO, https://perma.cc/U9N6-KVN6 (providing that Yahoo and
its vendors must comply with GDPR); see also YAHOO FR.,
https://perma.cc/4W48-XGT4 (demonstrating that Yahoo is still available in
the EU).
177. See DSL, supra note 8, art. 2 (“When data handling activities outside
the mainland territory of the PRC harm the national security, the public
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the PIPL that vary from the EU’s GDPR are squarely within the
ambit of the DSL—namely “national security.” By
understanding the PRC view as to what data falls within their
national security interests, companies can attempt to predict
what fickle regulatory risks they may potentially have to
address to remain in the PRC market. If a company is not
operating within the PRC, however, its regulatory risk is not
obviated due to the Three Laws’ extraterritorial provisions. The
Three Laws reach across borders and would require recognition
by a foreign court to be enforced.
B. U.S. Courts Will Likely Not Enforce a Three Laws Fine
How do U.S. courts treat foreign enforcement decisions in
the internet context? The Three Laws have not yet been enforced
in the United States, but it is highly unlikely that a U.S. court
would ever enforce a Three Laws fine against an American
company.
In Yahoo v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et
L’Antisemitisme,178 the Ninth Circuit dealt with a foreign
organization obtaining a French court penalty that would affect
a U.S. internet service provider’s content moderation.179 La
Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L’Antisemitisme (LICRA) obtained
an order from a French court that threatened significant
financial penalties if Yahoo did not bar access to Nazi
websites.180 Peculiar to this case is the fact that Yahoo had
already attempted to comply with the French court’s order and
limit access to Nazi websites within France.181 Since the internet
easily transcends borders, however, these websites were still
accessible from France by users seeking out Yahoo’s U.S.

interest, or the lawful rights and interests of citizens or organizations of the
PRC, legal liability is to be pursued according to the law.”); supra Part I.
178. 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006).
179. See generally id.
180. See id. at 1203–04.
181. See id. at 1205 (“However, after conducting its own Internet research
on yahoo.com, the district court found that even after this policy change,
Yahoo! ‘appear[s]’ not to have fully complied with the orders with respect to its
auction site.”).
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services.182 The Ninth Circuit initially focused on whether the
district court possessed personal jurisdiction over the French
parties when the lower court granted summary judgment in
favor of Yahoo.183 While the Ninth Circuit held that there were
sufficient minimum contacts for personal jurisdiction over the
French defendants, the court reversed and remanded based on
its view that the appeal was not ripe for decision.184 However,
the Yahoo court squarely addressed the enforceability of foreign
fines and penalties in the hypothetical.
In Yahoo, the Ninth Circuit analyzed the enforceability of
foreign penalties in U.S. courts and found it “exceedingly
unlikely that any court in California—or indeed elsewhere in
the United States—would enforce” a foreign monetary
penalty.185 While Yahoo applied California law, U.S. federal and
state courts are generally loath to enforce foreign fines or
penalties as a settled common law rule.186 “[T]he common law
rule against the enforcement of penal judgments is venerable
and widely-recognized.”187 Further, The Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations Law emphasizes that U.S. courts are not
required to recognize foreign fines or penalties.188
The background of Yahoo is key to understanding this case.
There was no actual fine or enforcement from the French court,

182. See id. at 1202 (“Conversely, any user in France can type
www.yahoo.com into his or her browser, or click the link to Yahoo.com on the
Yahoo! France home page, and thereby reach yahoo.com.”).
183. See id. at 1205–11.
184. See id. at 1223–24.
185. Id. at 1218.
186. See id. at 1219–20 (commenting that “California courts follow the
generally-observed rule that, [u]nless required to do so by treaty, no [i.e.
country] enforces the penal judgments of other states [i.e. countries] . . . [and
a] number of states have adopted an identical version of California’s Uniform
Act” (alterations added and in original) (internal quotation omitted)).
187. Id. at 1219 (citing Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 673–74 (1892)).
188. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 483 (AM. L.
INST. 1987) (“Courts in the United States are not required to recognize or to
enforce judgments for the collection of taxes, fines, or penalties rendered by
the courts of other states.”).
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merely the prospect of such monetary penalty.189 Yahoo brought
this suit partially based on a concern that the “threat of a
monetary penalty hangs like the sword of Damocles.”190 Even
without an actual monetary penalty, the Ninth Circuit still
analyzed and found that U.S. courts will generally not enforce
foreign fines and penalties.191 Using Yahoo as precedent, it is
unlikely that a U.S. court would enforce a PRC judgment
against a U.S. company predicated on the Three Laws.192
The internet’s nebulous borders loomed heavily in Yahoo.193
The PRC cordons off its cyberspace from the rest of the world’s
networks.194 Any use of Yahoo as precedent to avoid a PRC
penalty would need to address how the very mechanism of
evading geographic controls on browsers is decidedly against
PRC law, as well as the distinguishing fact that there are
technical and societal controls in place to prevent PRC citizens
from escaping the manicured network behind the Great

189. See Yahoo v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L’Antisemitisme, 433
F.3d 1199, 1218 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[The French defendants] have represented
that they have no intention of seeking a monetary penalty by the French court
so long as Yahoo! does not revert to its ‘old ways.’”).
190. Id. at 1218.
191. See id. at 1218–21.
192. See 30 AM. JUR. 2D Executions and Enforcement of Judgments § 653
(2022) (“Courts in the United States will not recognize or enforce a penal
judgment rendered in another nation.”).
193. See Yahoo, 433 F.3d at 1202 (“In actual practice, however, national
boundaries [on the internet] are highly permeable.”).
194. See Yaqiu Wang, In China, the ‘Great Firewall’ is Changing a
Generation, POLITICO (Sept. 1, 2020), https://perma.cc/H2E2-8RXM.
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Firewall.195 Yahoo nonetheless stands for the proposition that
U.S. courts will not rubber-stamp foreign fines and penalties.196
Since Yahoo explicitly finds most foreign fines and penalties
are unenforceable in the United States, a company’s Three Laws
risk will hinge on its exposure to PRC levers for enforcement.
Operating inside the PRC is obviously the highest-risk scenario
for a foreign corporation, since countries can most easily enforce
fines and penalties within their jurisdiction, extrajudicial or
otherwise.197 Even though Yahoo blunts the efficacy of foreign
penalties, there remains one scenario where the enforceability
of the Three Laws is an undecided issue. If a U.S. corporation
operates outside the PRC, but in a country where the PRC has
significant influence, the PRC could likely use its relationship
with the third country to enforce its regulatory goals.
Accordingly, understanding potential liability under the Three
Laws requires an examination of the PRC’s soft power and
influence.

195.

See id.

Gradually, the experience of being online in China changed. The list of
banned words and images grew. Articles and posts that managed to be
published got removed quickly. The government got savvier, and more
aggressive, about using its own technology: AI-powered censors could scan
images to determine whether they contained certain sensitive words or
phrases. An increasing number of foreign websites were block [sic] by the
Great Firewall. Twitter has long been inaccessible, and so have the Times
and the Journal. It is still possible to use VPNs and other circumvention
tools to scale the Great Firewall, but it is getting increasingly dangerous to
do so. Some people went to jail for selling VPNs, and others were fined for
merely using them.

196. See de Fontbrune v. Wofsy, 838 F.3d 992, 1006 (9th Cir. 2016)
(analyzing Yahoo and finding that four factors made the French order penal
and therefore unenforceable: (i) the French term translates to “penalty,” (ii)
the sanctions were imposed due to the French treating the conduct as a
“crime,” (iii) Yahoo dealt with a public dispute, and (iv) the penalty was
payable to the government).
197. See infra Part VIII.A.
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C. Soft Power Controls How Regulations Are Enforced Against
Foreign Entities
Soft power is defined as “the use of a country’s cultural or
economic influence to persuade other countries to do something,
rather than the use of military power.”198 Alternatively phrased,
soft power is a country’s ability to rely on tactics other than force
to achieve its objectives. Soft power is not just effective on other
countries, but also the people and organizations that comprise
those countries.199 How the Three Laws impact the globe will be
driven by the efficacy and strength of the PRC’s soft power
influence. Understanding the enforceability of the Three Laws
requires an examination of how the enforceability of analogous
EU data regulations relies on the EU’s soft power. Next, EU and
PRC soft power must be compared to determine their present
relative strengths and weaknesses. Finally, an analysis of
whether PRC soft power is growing or shrinking provides a
framework for predicting whether the Three Laws can be
effectively enforced globally against foreign companies.
1.

EU Data Regulations Have Teeth Because of the EU’s Soft
Power

In 2016, the EU passed the GDPR which came into force in
May 2018.200 Some believe that the GDPR is “the toughest
privacy and security law in the world.”201 GDPR’s chief focus was

198. Soft Power, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://perma.cc/D9GS-HG85.
199. See Steve Thomson, Soft Power: Why It Matters to Governments,
People, and Brands, BRAND FINANCE (Feb. 25, 2022), https://perma.cc/6AKW23U5 (“Soft power has a significant impact on the decisions people, businesses,
and governments make.”).
200. See Ilse Heine, 3 Years Later: An Analysis of GDPR Enforcement, CTR.
FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. (Sept. 13, 2021), https://perma.cc/YPV7-86RH
(“The European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) was
adopted in 2016 and officially launched in May 2018 to govern the use of
personal data by both EU and non-EU companies who collect, process, and
store the data of EU citizens.”).
201. Ben Wolford, What is GDPR, the EU’s New Data Protection Law?,
GDPR.EU, https://perma.cc/DK4Y-E9P5.
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on increasing privacy rights for individuals.202 Applying to all
types of businesses, GDPR fines violators up to the greater of
€20 million or four percent of their global revenue.203 Since
coming into effect in 2018, 854 fines have been issued totaling
€1,297,257,954.204 Astronomical numbers aside, GDPR’s
effectiveness and enforceability are directly tied to the EU’s soft
power.205
The enforcement of EU law on actors outside Brussels’
direct control is tied to EU political and economic influence—key
components of soft power.206 Government regulations can have
an outsized global effect if the government has sufficient soft
power to make noncompliance either fiscally, logistically, or
legally unfeasible.207 One of the key drivers of soft power is

202. See Sarah Gordon & Aliya Ram, Information Wars: How Europe
Became the World’s Data Police, FIN. TIMES (May 20, 2018),
https://perma.cc/W8TC-JDWD (“GDPR will harmonise data protection rules
across the world’s largest trading bloc, give greater rights to individuals over
how their data is used, put in place significant protections for children and
streamline regulators’ ability to crack down on breaches.”).
203. See Ben Wolford, What Are the GDPR Fines?, GDPR.EU,
https://perma.cc/M8EW-DSVH (explaining the possible fines for violation of
the GDPR).
204. See
GDPR
Fines
Tracker
&
Statistics,
PRIV. AFFS.,
https://perma.cc/HRY9-CFM9 (providing a dashboard of GDPR fines, the
violator, and the issuing country amongst other data).
205. See Paul M. Schwartz, Global Data Privacy: The EU Way, 94 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 771, 771 (2019) (“[T]he EU has become the world’s privacy cop, acting
in a unilateral fashion and exercising de facto influence over other nations
through its market power.”).
206. See Steven Blockmans, Why Europe Should Harden Its Soft Power to
Lawfare, CTR. FOR EUR. POL’Y STUD. (June 15, 2020), https://perma.cc/3ZQZ4VKJ (“The so-called Brussels effect—the impact of EU law on its neighbours
and global corporations operating in the single market, has been waning for
years. Nowadays its effect is mostly felt in anti-trust law, or in the chemicals
directive or the General Data Protection Regulation.”).
207. See Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 NW. L. REV. 1, 5 (2012)
(“The following conditions are necessary for a jurisdiction to dictate rules for
global commerce: the jurisdiction must have a large domestic market,
significant regulatory capacity, and the propensity to enforce strict rules over
inelastic targets (e.g., consumer markets) as opposed to elastic targets (e.g.,
capital).”).
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economic might.208 Global companies need to find and exploit
any opportunity to grow their business.209 A market rich in
opportunities gives the government that controls said market
increased leverage over companies that desire access.210
Accordingly, the more powerful the economy, the more power a
government has to influence foreign companies under the allure
of market access. Simply stated, a country will be more effective
in regulating foreign companies if said companies cannot forego
access to that country’s market. Therefore, companies must
consider the PRC’s soft power in relation to the soft power that
allows the EU to enforce the GDPR.
2.

Comparing EU and PRC Soft Power

The PRC views building soft power as a national priority.211
The PRC toolkit for achieving this goal can be categorized into
three general areas: culture promotion and educational
exchanges; media, social media, and political messaging; and
the soft power aspects of economic cooperation.212 The last
category is most applicable to determining how a sovereign’s
regulations affect private-sector firm decisions in a given
jurisdiction.

208.
209.

See id. at 11–12.
See Jan-Emile van Rossum, 5 Benefits of International Expansion,
THE BUS. J. (Dec. 18, 2017, 3:15 AM), https://perma.cc/73P4-BF3D
(“[I]nternational expansion offers a chance to conquer new territories and
reach more . . . consumers, thus increasing sales.”).
210. See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J.
ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 3 (“With its power to prohibit or compel, to take or give
money, the state can and does selectively help or hurt a vast number of
industries.”).
211. See Eleanor Albert, China’s Big Bet on Soft Power, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELS., https://perma.cc/H543-PCQ4 (last updated Feb. 9, 2018, 7:00
AM) (quoting Xi Jinping in 2014 as saying that “[w]e should increase China’s
soft power, give a good Chinese narrative, and better communicate China’s
message to the world”).
212. See EUROPEAN THINK-TANK NETWORK ON CHINA, CHINA’S SOFT POWER
IN EUROPE: FALLING ON HARD TIMES 7–10 (Ties Dams et al. eds., 2021).

THE THREE LAWS: THE CCP THROWS DOWN THE DATA
REGULATION GAUNTLET
1213
The largest obstacle to the PRC’s influence objectives is the
country’s declining international reputation.213 While the EU
“has a romantic and touristic appeal, a (struggling) sense of
supranational unity, and its far-reaching foreign policy of
assistance[,] it is legitimate to ask whether China’s ‘charm
offensive’ is losing momentum.”214 The largest driver of PRC
global influence is its economic might and the corresponding
secondary effects.215
China’s economic might is roughly analogous to the EU’s.
According to the World Bank, the PRC and the EU are the two
closest competitors to the United States in terms of largest gross
domestic product (GDP).216 Similarly, the Fortune Global 500 is
dominated by companies headquartered in these three
jurisdictions.217 As two of the largest economies in the world,
both the EU and the PRC have formidable global influence. This
economic influence is most effective when used against other,
poorer countries—best evidenced by the PRC’s economic
development efforts abroad through the Belt and Road
Initiative.218

213. See Daniele Carminati, The State of China’s Soft Power in 2020,
E-INTERNATIONAL RELS. (July 3, 2020), https://perma.cc/Q6YK-R8PE (“China’s
culture still has limited appeal, its values mostly fail to reflect the country’s
image and reputation abroad, and its foreign policy is seen with skepticism at
best—and as hegemonic at worst.”).
214. Id.
215. See id. (“[I]t is fair to say that China’s soft power heavily relies on its
economic clout.”).
216. See GDP (current US$)—European Union, United States, China,
WORLD BANK, https://perma.cc/R8C3-S2SG (providing statistics on EU
($15.292 trillion), PRC ($14.273 trillion), and US ($20.894 trillion) GDPs as of
2020).
217. See generally Global 500, FORTUNE, https://perma.cc/F824-GRFJ.
218. See Shan Saeed, For Developing World, Belt and Road Initiative Is
Best Deal Around, NIKKEI ASIA (May 6, 2020), https://perma.cc/Z2PN-G8HZ
(“China has been willing to invest in projects that Western funders reject,
giving developing nations a chance to implement their highest priority
investments.”).
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3.

The Belt and Road Initiative

Characterized by some as “China’s Marshall Plan,” the Belt
and Road Initiative (BRI) seeks to grow China’s influence in
pursuit of its national priorities.219 As of December 2021, over
145 countries have participated in the BRI since it began in
2013.220 A participating country receives PRC direct investment
or contracts with PRC-affiliated companies often financed by
PRC-sourced loans.221 A large focus of the BRI is building PRC
influence in developing economies in Asia, Africa, South
America, and the Middle East.222 The focus on developing and
impoverished countries allows PRC investment to enjoy an
outsized economic and influential effect in recipient countries,
but not without criticism of PRC gamesmanship.223 Critics of the
BRI characterize the true motivation behind the initiative as
“[t]he developing world . . . helping [to] fix China’s problems.”224
One of the most frequent criticisms is the accusation that BRI

219. See SIMON SHEN & WILSON CHAN, A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE BELT
ROAD INITIATIVE AND THE MARSHALL PLAN 2 (2018) (finding “five core
similarities in the background and purposes” of the Marshall Plan and BRI,
“namely (1) boosting exports, (2) exporting currency, (3) countering a rival, (4)
fostering strategic division, and (5) siphon[ing] away diplomatic support”).
220. See Cristoph Nidopil, Countries of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI),
GREEN FIN. & DEV. CTR., https://perma.cc/K63L-RQ6P.
221. See id. (summarizing 2021 BRI projects as comprising “about US$13.9
billion . . . through investment, and US$45.6 billion through contracts (partly
financed by Chinese loans)”).
222. See SHEN & CHAN, supra note 219, at 9 (commenting on the growing
trend of “engagement to African and Arab countries, as well as more
construction in South America” in addition to “Asian countries continu[ing] to
receive the largest share of Chinese BRI investments (about 35% in 2021)”).
223. See James T. Areddy, Hidden Debt Plagues China’s Belt and Road
Infrastructure Plan, Studies Find, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 28, 2021),
https://perma.cc/7DM7-BXZR (reporting on findings that BRI projects subject
recipient countries to hidden debt and the projects themselves are troubled by
corruption, labor violations, and environmental risks).
224. See id. (“Beijing has . . . consistently pursued three goals: turning the
enormous haul of dollars earned by the nation’s exporters into foreign loans;
keeping its massive domestic construction and industrial sectors busy by
pursuing building projects abroad; and securing commodities like oil and grain
to plug domestic shortfalls.”).
AND
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projects create “debt traps” for recipient countries.225 This
indebtedness creates perverse incentives for recipient countries:
BRI participants must either kowtow to the PRC or face onerous
terms that may threaten the sovereignty of recipient country
resources.226 BRI infrastructure projects also create
opportunities for exporting PRC technology.
A key component of BRI is known as the Digital Silk Road
(DSR).227 While debate surrounds the primary motives for the
DSR, it has spread PRC technology—with its accompanying
security and human rights concerns and risks—to BRI
countries.228 Regardless of potentially malicious motives, the
DSR is the PRC’s attempt to increase its digital influence at the
expense of the U.S.229 With technology developing at a torrential
225. See id. (“China has appeared reluctant to write off its loans to foreign
countries, which on average carr[y] interest rates four times higher than
offered by other bilateral lenders and maturity periods of a third as long.”).
226. See Dylan Gertsel, It’s a (Debt) Trap! Managing China-IMF
Cooperation Across the Belt and Road, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD.,
https://perma.cc/859Y-3QZ9 (“The IMF has scrutinized multiple aspects of the
BRI, repeatedly warning of unsustainable debt levels, predatory lending, and
the lack of project transparency.”). But see Jessica C. Liao, How BRI Debt Puts
China at Risk, THE DIPLOMAT (Oct. 27, 2021), https://perma.cc/4DG8-FR66
(“Whether Beijing seeks to use debt as a tool to expand its influence and
leverage over other countries remains under debate.”).
227. See Robert Greene & Paul Triolo, Will China Control the Global
Internet Via Its Digital Silk Road?, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE
(May 8, 2020), https://perma.cc/Q2DY-RJWH (“Beijing wants Chinese
companies to participate in building many more pieces of financial,
information, and telecommunications networks globally, with the goal of
increasing China’s overall capacity to participate in international technology
standards setting and governance norm bodies.”).
228. See id.
Another misperception of the DSR is that it is a masterplan by Beijing to
deploy its “techno-authoritarian” model to countries along the BRI.
Certainly, Chinese companies export facial recognition technology and
privacy-invasive cyber infrastructure that is used in emerging market
countries—yet deployment of these technologies in emerging markets is
very much a demand-driven phenomenon.

229. See Elles Houweling, How Huawei’s Power Play Fits into China’s
Digital Silk Road, VERDICT (Aug. 6, 2021), https://perma.cc/Z63F-T4VP (“At its
core, the DSR is a solution that engenders a less US-centric and more
Sino-centric global digital order.”).
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pace and touching more aspects of everyone’s lives, this digital
influence clearly expands the PRC’s influence around the world.
The PRC has expanded its influence, both digital and
economic, to hundreds of countries. The DSR component of the
BRI and the nature of PRC “private-sector” companies have
provoked suspicions and criticisms that these projects will allow
the PRC to achieve its international objectives through
underhanded means.230 Nevertheless, the PRC already exerts
tremendous influence, and predictions about its future growth
or decline are useless to companies attempting to determine how
to navigate the Three Laws now. Failing to do so will leave
companies at the whim of the PRC’s efforts to achieve its global
objectives through “lawfare.”
The PRC wholeheartedly embraces “lawfare” as a tactic for
achieving its international goals.231 Lawfare is “the use of law as
a means of accomplishing what might otherwise require the
application of traditional military force.”232 The Three Laws and
their extraterritorial provisions are a powerful weapon in the
PRC’s growing lawfare arsenal. Combining the influence curried
via BRI and the lawfare philosophy, the PRC will expand its
influence even further. While companies used to only need
worry about CCP laws while they were inside the PRC, the

230. See Lindsay Maizland & Andrew Chatzky, Huawei: China’s
Controversial Tech Giant, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS., https://perma.cc/5GPVYXT2 (last updated Aug. 6, 2020, 8:00 AM) (providing a detailed overview of
the security concerns revolving around China’s flagship information
technology company being used to “spy, sabotage, or take other actions on the
[PRC government’s] behalf”).
231. See Bradley A. Thayer & Lianchao Han, The Growing Threat of
China’s Lawfare, THE HILL (Apr. 9, 2021), https://perma.cc/J8PL-J47F (“In
practice, Xi increasingly uses law as a weapon to crack down on dissent to
ensure regime security, while simultaneously employing it as a weapon in the
CCP’s quest for world hegemony.”); Jonas Parello-Plesner, With Denmark,
China Tests the Reach of Its Lawfare into Democracies, GERMAN MARSHALL
FUND (2022), https://perma.cc/Q2FS-UMUV (“Today, the [CCP] is extending
its long authoritarian arm and misusing legal principles, so-called lawfare, far
beyond its borders and into democracies around the world.”).
232. Charles J. Dunlap Jr., Lawfare 101: A Primer, 97 MIL. REV. 8, 9 (2017)
(“[Lawfare] is something of an example of what Chinese strategist Sun Tzu
might say is the ‘supreme excellence’ of war, which aims to subdue ‘the enemy’s
resistance without fighting.’”).
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advancement of BRI, lawfare, and the PRC’s overall global
influence compels organizations to analyze their regulatory risk
through a worldwide, geopolitical framework.
VIII.

RECOMMENDATIONS

As described above, non-PRC companies must gauge their
regulatory risk under the Three Laws based upon a holistic
understanding of PRC objectives and interpretations of past
regulatory actions.233 Navigating the onerous requirements of
the Three Laws and their ambiguity is an uphill battle.234 From
a data perspective, companies may gauge their risk by reviewing
the types of PRC citizen data they collect, store, and process.
Once companies analyze their risk from a data perspective, they
must then analyze their operations in light of geography,
influence, and prevailing international power dynamics.
Companies would be well-advised to conduct this analysis
through the lens of three different categories: operations within
the PRC and behind the Great Firewall; operations with zero
presence behind the Great Firewall; and operations in countries
with significant PRC influence.
A. Companies Behind the Firewall
Companies operating within the PRC face the highest
regulatory compliance requirements and risk.235 As Ant
Group,236 Didi,237 Tesla,238 and Apple239 demonstrate, the lure of
233. See supra Parts II–VII.
234. See Elizabeth Cole et al., China Finalizes Data Security Law to
Strengthen Regulation on Data Protection, JONES DAY (June 2021),
https://perma.cc/G4RL-8V2B (“The exact scope of these data categories are
intentionally broad and vague to allow for flexible interpretation. This will add
an additional level of uncertainty for businesses.”); see also supra Part I.
235. See Monopoly (Hasbro, English ed. 2020) (“Do not pass Go; Do not
collect $200.”).
236. See supra Part III.
237. See supra Part IV.A.
238. See supra Part IV.B.
239. See supra Part V.B.
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success in one of the world’s most lucrative markets carries with
it the probability of sudden, unwanted CCP attention and
crackdowns. Companies operating inside the PRC must work
assiduously to stay informed of regulatory developments and
maintain compliance.240 The carrot of more than a billion
consumers inside the PRC allows the CCP to wield a big
stick—the Three Laws’ requirements and potential
punishments. Companies operating in the PRC must evaluate
the costs of compliance with the Three Laws and soberly
consider the benefits. Optimism is foolish.241 Companies with
established revenue streams in the PRC, like Apple and Tesla,
cannot rely on their prior success as a shield against future
shifts in PRC actions.242 Continued good luck does not good risk
management make. Even the world’s largest companies must
still operate with both eyes open if they are within the PRC’s
borders. However, remaining outside the PRC does not negate
the risk presented by the Three Laws.
B. Companies with No Presence in the PRC
Companies operating in jurisdictions completely removed
from the PRC are relatively safe from the barriers and risks of
the Three Laws, but technology companies reliant on data easily
scale internationally and will thus likely not be confined to just
one jurisdiction.243 However, a majority of the world’s largest
240. See CHINA’S CYBERSECURITY LAW, supra note 11 (“Companies
operating in China should take swift actions now to assess their specific
obligations under the CSL and other related regulations and adopt a
comprehensive approach to mitigate the compliance risks.”).
241. See Steve Saleen, How Chinese Officials Hijacked My Company, WALL
ST. J. (July 31, 2020, 6:13 PM), https://perma.cc/DCZ7-PQRM (“The deal was
a sham. It was a trap designed to secure my intellectual property, then use
intimidation tactics and lies to nullify the agreement and seize control.”).
242. See Barrett, supra note 104 (“Tesla’s experience is ‘a warning shot
that they need to stay between the lines, and not be so flamboyant in their
success . . . . You can’t be so far up front that you become arrogant in the way
you conduct yourself.’”).
243. See Jim Molis, Critical Considerations for Tech Companies Seeking to
Grow Internationally, THE BUS. J. (Jan. 31, 2020), https://perma.cc/XKL9WAYQ (“Tech startups can reach international markets quickly because the
world is increasingly connected.”).
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technology companies are headquartered in the United
States.244 Hypothetically, a U.S. company with an international
presence—but not one in the PRC—would likely be shielded
from the United States enforcing a PRC extraterritorial penalty
against them.245
Recognition of PRC judgments by U.S. courts is an
unsettled issue, the resolution of which may depend on whether
the PRC judicial system ultimately values due process.246 The
number of U.S. courts recognizing a PRC judgment can be
counted on one hand.247 Further, as Yahoo demonstrates, U.S.
courts will not enforce foreign fines and penalties on the foreign
nation’s behalf.248 However, the Three Laws—and their
international relations implications—introduce complex issues
far beyond a business deal gone bad. A Three Laws fine on a
U.S. company would introduce diplomatic and political
considerations that would dramatically affect the likelihood that
a company would have to pay an assessed penalty.

244. See generally THOMSON REUTERS, THE TOP 100 GLOBAL TECHNOLOGY
LEADERS (2018), https://perma.cc/2BAP-LR39 (PDF).
245. See supra Part VII.B.
246. See Mark Moedritzer et al., Judgments ‘Made in China’ But
Enforceable in the United States?: Obtaining Recognition and Enforcement in
the United States of Monetary Judgments Entered in China Against U.S.
Companies Doing Business Abroad, 44 INT’L LAW. 817, 835 (2010)
[C]ases specifically addressing recognition of foreign judgments entered in
China are still relatively few. Based on developments in the legal system in
the People’s Republic of China over the past two decades, it is increasingly
likely that a U.S. court evaluating whether to recognize a judgment entered
in China would conclude that the system of justice in China comports with
traditional Western notions of due process, and thus that element would
likely not be a bar to recognition in a U.S. court.

247. See Meng Yu, U.S. Court Recognizes a Chinese Judgment for the
Third Time, CHINA JUST. OBSERVER (Feb. 4, 2020), https://perma.cc/YHV4S2B5 (“It marks the third time for [a] U.S. court to recognize a Chinese
judgment. Prior to this, two Chinese judgments were recognized respectively
in the U.S. in 2009, and in 2016 [sic].”).
248. See supra Part VII.B.
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“During the past several years, the U.S.-China relationship
has reached its lowest point in decades.”249 American
recognition of a Three Laws fine against a U.S. company would
signal either U.S. parity with or submission to the PRC.250 The
PRC would likely tout any such recognition as a significant
victory in its quest to be considered the supreme world power.251
Thus, the U.S. political and diplomatic establishment would
likely do whatever possible to protect a U.S. company and avoid
allowing the PRC to achieve such a significant international
accomplishment. Additionally, companies like Alphabet, which
still maintains a presence in the PRC despite having its services
blocked by the Great Firewall, could be a prime target for the
PRC.252 Enforcing the Three Laws against a U.S. company
would be a valuable tactic for achieving PRC international
objectives and prompts an interesting, unsettled question. What
if a PRC citizen in the United States registers for a U.S.
company’s services that ostensibly violate the Three Laws?
249. Isaac Chotiner, The Fraying of U.S.-China Relations, THE NEW
YORKER (Nov. 20, 2021), https://perma.cc/NX8J-WSLN; see also Owen
Churchill, China–US Relations: Blinken Says Beijing is Bringing More
Aggression to Competitive and Cooperative Ties, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Jan.
25, 2022, 2:00 PM), https://perma.cc/X7VR-PERJ (“The US-China relationship
is becoming increasingly adversarial, according to US Secretary of State
Antony Blinken who on Monday criticized the Chinese government for being
‘more assertive and aggressive’ than in previous decades.”).
250. See Ryan Hass, How China Is Responding to Escalating Strategic
Competition with the US, BROOKINGS (Mar. 1, 2021), https://perma.cc/4E2829AH (“To [achieve their national goals], China appears to be pursuing a
three-pronged medium-term strategy: maintaining a non-hostile external
environment in order to focus on domestic priorities; reducing dependence on
America while increasing the rest of the world’s dependence on China; and
expanding the reach of Chinese influence overseas.”).
251. See Chotiner, supra note 249 (“Xi Jinping is now stating that China’s
political system is demonstratively superior to Western democracies in its
ability to deliver practical governance outcomes, and so the narrative is, ‘Our
system is better than yours, and Western democracy is a path to infighting,
polarization, and institutional atrophy.’”).
252. See William Yuen Yee, Google Parent Company Alphabet Is Back in
China (Because It Never Left), SUPCHINA (June 18, 2020),
https://perma.cc/T62Y-YH6W (“While widely credited with ‘having left China,’
Google still operates a significant in-country presence and through its parent
company, Alphabet, continues to launch new projects in China and invest into
Chinese companies of all sizes.”).
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Before COVID-19 countermeasures blocked free travel,
millions of PRC citizens escaped the confines of the Great
Firewall and visited the United States.253 These PRC tourists
could enroll in services or purchase products that collect
“sensitive personal information” or any of the gamut of classified
datatypes that trigger Three Laws liability.254 This vector of
enforcement could present an opportunity for the PRC to
achieve its desired strategic international achievement.255
Companies should be aware that, given the vague and
ambiguous statutory text, the Three Laws could be invoked by
the innocuous action of a PRC citizen registering for an account
or a company marketing its services to PRC citizens outside the
PRC.256 Methods for dealing with this possibility could present
difficult U.S. constitutional questions of a company
discriminating against customers based upon their national
origin.257 Disallowing PRC citizens from participating in
data-collection products may seem like a simple solution to
avoid Three Laws liability, but as with any complicated issue,
solutions often create more problems. If the PRC desires to
enforce the Three Laws extraterritorially but cannot achieve
this strategic international objective in the United States, the
253. Agne Blazyte, Number of Tourist Arrivals in the United States from
China from 2005 to 2020, STATISTA (Feb. 8, 2022), https://perma.cc/BN6DYTPJ.
254. See supra Part I.
255. See supra notes 249–251 and accompanying text.
256. See McKenzie, supra note 22 (“It remains uncertain, for example,
whether an online company based outside China will become subject to the
PIPL merely because it allows a Chinese resident to register an account or
when its services are actively marketed to Chinese residents.”).
257. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (“No person in the
United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.”); see also Press Release, Ctr. for Am. Progress, Tech Companies
Supported by the Federal Government Should Share Profits With Workers,
New CAP Proposal Says (Apr. 19, 2018) (“The federal government has been a
major funder of research to advance innovation and technical understanding
for approximately 80 years. The tech industry is heavily supported by
Washington . . . .”).
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PRC could potentially seek other jurisdictions more amenable to
assisting the PRC in its global ambitions—the vassals of its BRI.
C. Companies Operating in BRI Countries
Enforcement of the Three Laws against a U.S. company
that operates in a BRI vassal country could cause a cataclysmic
shift in international relations and law. For the company, a
Three Laws enforcement could significantly influence the
business decision to remain in the BRI vassal nation.
Technology has had a positive effect on individual freedoms and
rights in countries throwing off the yoke of dictatorship,
arguably further motivating the CCP’s cyber sovereignty policy
in pursuit of avoiding similar results in the PRC.258 A U.S.
technology company abandoning a BRI vassal market could
have a deleterious effect on the individual rights of the BRI
vassal’s citizens. Further, the withdrawal of a U.S. company
could damage diplomatic relations between the United States,
the BRI vassal state, and the PRC.259 No matter what,
enforcement of the Three Laws in BRI vassal states would
provide a victory for the PRC on multiple fronts—raising
international estimations of PRC power, lessening U.S.
hegemony, and providing an economic demand vacuum that the
PRC could fill with any of its similar companies. Unfortunately,
the scope of this potential problem is beyond the ability of any
258. See Catherine O’Donnell, New Study Quantifies Use of Social Media
in Arab Spring, UNIV. OF WASH. (Sept. 12, 2011), https://perma.cc/8G6HXWAH (“[S]ocial media played a central role in shaping political debates in the
Arab Spring. Conversations about revolution often preceded major events, and
social media has carried inspiring stories of protest across international
borders.”). But see Haythem Guesmi, The Social Media Myth About the Arab
Spring, AL JAZEERA (Jan. 27, 2021), https://perma.cc/LUG5-9PJ7 (“Social
media networks did not trigger the Arab revolutions, but they did contribute
to the counter-revolutions.”).
259. See THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE 195 (1999)
(“No two countries that both had McDonald’s had fought a war against each
other since each got its McDonald’s.”). But see Paul Musgrave, The Beautiful,
Dumb Dream of McDonald’s Peace Theory, FOREIGN POL’Y (Nov. 26, 2020, 3:58
PM), https://perma.cc/7VQ2-R6NJ (refuting Friedman’s capitalist peace
hypothesis in favor of a theory that “market development diminishes prospects
of war between two countries but doesn’t rule it out”).
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single company to manage. Governments and diplomacy are the
most effective tools to insulate private-sector companies from
the whims of global powers.260 Unfortunately, the United States
may lack legitimacy in the digital privacy arena due to its data
collection practices.261 The EU could build upon the philosophy
that led to its enactment of the GDPR by leading the push to a
diplomatic resolution of the problems created when geopolitics,
technology, and lawfare collide. Regardless, the Three Laws
represent one of the strongest indicators that the world may
shift beneath our feet in the near future as global powers wage
their disputes in an unprecedented manner.
The prospect of the PRC enforcing the Three Laws as a
lawfare tactic raises serious questions about how international
law currently treats lawfare and extraterritorial provisions in
domestic laws. The PRC’s preferred lawfare tactics should
prompt a reevaluation of the international community’s
standards for recognizing foreign judgments, fines, and
enforcement penalties. Permitting nations to reach across their
borders and exert their own laws in other countries in which
they have influence should be drastically limited. Were the PRC
unable to enforce the Three Laws against a U.S. company in
either the PRC (because the U.S. company has no presence in
the PRC) or because the U.S. company is completely removed
from the curtain of the Great Firewall, current international law
260. See Justin Sherman, U.S. Diplomacy Is a Necessary Part of
Countering China’s Digital Authoritarianism, LAWFARE (Mar. 17, 2020, 1:18
PM), https://perma.cc/JH3R-BDUN (“Digital diplomacy is important for trade;
it’s important for national security; and it’s important for collaborating with
other liberal democracies to establish and reinforce clear, democratic
regulations and behavior around artificial intelligence and emerging
surveillance issues.”).
261. See Justin Sink & John Harney, CIA Secretly Collected ‘Bulk’ Data on
American Citizens, Senators Say, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 11, 2022, 12:31 AM),
https://perma.cc/Z54L-WARS (last updated Feb. 11, 2022, 7:13 AM) (reporting
that the U.S. intelligence community collected hundreds of millions of
American citizen’s data); Jose Luis Magana, Senator Calls for Review of U.S.
Intelligence Gathering as Outcry Grows from Germany, Other Nations,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 29, 2013, 1:40 AM), https://perma.cc/6NQ8-PU3Z (last
updated Jan. 12, 2019, 5:40 AM) (“The NSA’s program of spying on . . . foreign
leaders was already damaging relations with some of the closest U.S. allies.”).
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structures encourage a type of forum shopping. By deciding a
penalty and then seeking a forum that would enforce it, the PRC
would wage its lawfare strategy on the battlefields of developing
countries. While America’s international reputation is battered,
especially when it comes to individual privacy rights, the
international community should recognize the problematic
precedent that foreign enforcement of the Three Laws would
present. Limiting the reach of powerful nations with audacious
regulations should be a priority, if only to confine diplomacy and
global power struggles to their traditional venues. Otherwise,
much like war is now carried out in cyberspace, international
squabbles will be conducted on new, uncertain battlefields.
While many like to think of courtrooms as gladiatorial arenas,
the fate of billions should not hang in the balance as one judge
sits alone in whatever country a more powerful nation chooses.
CONCLUSION
The Three Laws are a calculated tool for the CCP to achieve
its domestic and international objectives.262 These laws allow
the CCP to seek any geopolitical advantage at the expense of
their rivals by using data’s power to influence and shape people
and events.263 The Three Laws are the first phase of the CCP’s
evolving attempt to use data regulation to further its
information warfare strategy. Considering their recent
enactment, however, the global impact of the Three Laws is yet
to be determined. But companies and governments must think
and plan steps ahead to counter the Three Laws’ potentially
calamitous
consequences.
Understanding
the
CCP’s
motivations, strategies, and tools for controlling data helps one
comprehend not just issues in cyberspace, but also the current
tension in the business and geopolitical realms swirling around
the PRC. Every battle is won before it is fought.264

262. See supra Part II.
263. See supra Part VI.
264. See Sun Tzu, The Art of War, in THE SEVEN MILITARY CLASSICS OF
ANCIENT CHINA 157, 162 (Ralph D. Sawyer & Mei-Chün Sawyer trans., 1993)
(“One who, fully prepared, awaits the unprepared will be victorious.”).

